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As the science of synthetic biology matures, engineers have begun to deliver
real-world applications which are the beginning of what could radically transform
our lives. Recent progress indicates synthetic biology will produce transformative
breakthroughs. Examples include: 1) synthesizing chemicals for medicines which
are expensive and difficult to produce; 2) producing protein alternatives; 3)
altering genomes to combat deadly diseases; 4) killing antibiotic-resistant
pathogens; and 5) speeding up vaccine production.
Although synthetic biology promises great benefits, many stakeholders have
expressed concerns over safety and security risks from creating biological
behavior never seen before in nature. As with any emerging technology, there is
the risk of malicious use known as the dual-use problem. The technology is
becoming democratized and de-skilled, and people in do-it-yourself communities
can tinker with genetic code, similar to how programming has become prevalent
through the ease of using macros in spreadsheets. While easy to program, it may
be non-trivial to validate novel biological behavior. Nevertheless, we must be able
to certify synthetically engineered organisms behave as expected, and be
confident they will not harm natural life or the environment.
Synthetic biology is an interdisciplinary engineering domain, and
interdisciplinary problems require interdisciplinary solutions. Using an
interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation lays foundations for verifying,
validating, and certifying safety and security of synthetic biology applications
through traditional software engineering concepts about safety, security, and
reliability of systems. These techniques can help stakeholders navigate what is
currently a confusing regulatory process.
The contributions of this dissertation are: 1) creation of domain-specific
patterns to help synthetic biologists develop assurance cases using evidence and
arguments to validate safety and security of designs; 2) application of software
product lines and feature models to the modular DNA parts of synthetic biology
commonly known as BioBricks, making it easier to find safety features during
design; 3) a technique for analyzing DNA sequence motifs to help characterize
proteins as toxins or non-toxins; 4) a legal investigation regarding what makes
regulating synthetic biology challenging; and 5) a repeatable workflow for
leveraging safety and security artifacts to develop assurance cases for synthetic
biology systems.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Synthetic biology (SB) is the practice of engineering living organisms by modifying
their DNA. The discipline of SB has advanced rapidly over the last 30 years due to
overcoming key technical challenges such as repeatability of experiments and
standardization of parts [33]. Recent successes include: sensing heavy metals for
pollution mitigation [19]; development of synthetic biofuels [226]; engineering cells
to communicate and produce bodily tissues [181]; emerging medical applications
[118,221]; and basic computational purposes [47]. This dissertation uses the
acronym “SEBO” to stand for “Synthetically Engineered Biological Organisms.”
Synthetic biologists design new functionality, encode it in DNA strands, and
insert this new DNA component into a living organism such as the common K-12
strain of the bacteria Escherichia coli (E. coli). As the SEBO reproduces, it
replicates the new DNA along with its native DNA code and builds proteins that
perform an engineered functionality. Software engineers program computing
systems to perform new functions, and synthetic biologists program SEBOs to
perform new functions. Programming new cellular behavior is becoming easier
and more prevalent as companies offer increasingly affordable DNA synthesis
and design services.
A DNA sequence is a string of four base pairs A (adenine), C (cytosine), G
(guanine), and T (thymine) which can be combined in any order [11]. It is possible
2to encode “logic” within cells using different parts to build molecular
communication systems, either intracellular or intercellular [11]. Engineers can
design cells which, similar to silicon devices, can sense, actuate, compute, and
communicate based on the flow of molecular signals at the nanoscale [3]. SEBOs
can thus be described as living computational systems running software.
Biological software, like traditional software, needs to be tested, validated, and
verified for correctness within its run-time environment. A key insight of this
dissertation is that traditional software engineering principles could be beneficial
for testing, validating, and verifying SEBOs.
Furthermore, biological software, like traditional software, could be designed
negligently or with malicious intent. This means SB is a “dual-use” technology
because its potential for beneficial or malicious uses. Researchers have already
created dangerous SEBOs, such as: 1) building the polio virus in 2002 [191]; 2)
reconstructing the Spanish Flu virus in 2005 [209]; 3) booting a novel bacteria
DNA genome in 2010 [87]; 4) engineering a strain of the Avian Flu virus to be
more communicable among mammals in 2012 [105]; 5) and making a new strain
of the Spanish Flu virus in 2014 [63]. Synthetic, home-brewed heroin was
considered feasible back in 2014 [59,219]. In 2019, a gene-editing company
unintentionally inserted a bacterial plasmid into a bull, fortunately with no obvious
negative consequences [152].
More people are engaging in SB every year, with the notable example of the
International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) Competition held annually
at MIT in Boston, Massachusetts [102]. Over 300 teams of students, from high
school to graduate, compete by designing SEBOs to solve real-world problems.
Teams must submit their engineered parts along with their designs and
experimental results to an open-source collection of genetic components called
“BioBricks.” This BioBrick repository, called The Registry of Standard Parts [265],
3contains over 45,000 DNA sequences with descriptions in various detail. In fact,
the SB community aggressively encourages an open-source approach to
democratize and “de-skill” the technology [63], and affordable desktop SB kits are
available for sale online [202].
The technology of SB is rapidly changing and current U.S. laws and
international regulatory frameworks are ill-suited for such a rapidly moving target.
It remains unclear which U.S. agencies should have jurisdiction to regulate
SEBOs, let alone what research activities should be prohibited. These issues are
of extreme importance, because engineers are creating SEBOs with new
functions and little to nothing is known about how these new organisms will react
in the environment or affect “natural” life [267].
To address these issues, this dissertation explores the following topics:
• The application of assurance cases and assurance patterns to support
safety and security of SB designs;
• The application of feature models to SB designs to more easily find parts to
meet safety and security requirements;
• A discussion of what makes SB difficult to regulate on both a domestic and
international level, with suggestions for collaborations among synthetic
biologists, software engineers, and cybersecurity experts;
• An extension of prior work to analyze motifs in DNA sequences for
characterizing them as toxins or non-toxins, along with new ways to visualize
motif data; and
• A new workflow process for leveraging fault trees and attack-defense trees
to semi-automatically generate assurance cases for SB designs.
41.1 Motivating Example
Imagine that the hottest new consumer product of next year is the “Chianettle,” an
Internet of Things (IoT) biological system which lives and grows in an aquarium
connected to a tablet or personal computer, a high-level overview of which is
depicted in Figure 1.1. The organism is the product of SB, a “smart” algae which
users can interact with through a microfluidic chamber. As seen in Figure 1.2, the
microfluidic chamber has sensors and actuators which provide real-time feedback
through a mobile application, and users can either manually intervene or opt for
automatic mode, which will adjust the aquarium’s environment to create ideal
conditions with respect to temperature, pH level, nutrient level, as well as
frequency and duration of light.1
Figure 1.1: A high-level overview of the “Chianettle,” an imaginary SB
product.
What makes Chianettle truly special is that it is the first “social media” plant.
Users can link their individual plants to various online services such as Facebook,
1The Chianettle is partially inspired by: 1) the DIY Glowing Plant Kickstarter project [240], which
is no longer active; 2) recent developments using SB to engineer plant-to-plant communication
[231], and 3) progress in designing various switches and Boolean logic gates in plants [6].
5Instagram, and Snapchat, allowing friends to become part of the story and track
the progress of other plants, even plants linked to celebrity and influencer
accounts. There is also a competition ladder where users from across the globe
challenge each other to make their Chianettles the best in the world in various
characteristics such as size, growth rate, or luminosity.
Figure 1.2: A low-level overview of the “Chianettle,” an imaginary
SB product.
For a monthly subscription fee, users can access a library of pre-approved
and well-documented DNA plasmids specifically designed for altering the
behavior and characteristics of their plants. Users can either order the plasmids
via mail or synthesize them at home using optional add-on hardware, the
Chianettle Plasmid Printer. In addition to the subscription service, there exists a
vigorous open-source DIY community devoted to sharing custom plasmids which
enable the algae to behave in ways never seen before in nature. Finally, there is
an unofficial mobile application developed and maintained by the DIY community
6which offers more automation than the manufacturer’s software, allowing users to
“one-click” a plasmid from the open-source database, download the DNA
sequence to the Plasmid Printer, synthesize the plasmid, and then send it to the
microfluidic chamber to transform the algae with a new genetic program.
Now for the bad news. It is unclear what will happen if a Chianettle escapes
its aquarium, such as being dumped into a toilet, swimming pool, or lake. In
addition, as an IoT device, all of the software and hardware interfaces have
publicly-facing network connections making them vulnerable to hacking. It is not
clear what new behaviors can be introduced by DIY tinkering, let alone malicious
hacking.
As an emerging engineering discipline, SB offers a plethora of multifaceted,
interdisciplinary challenges. The average length of a single plasmid can be
5,000bp, or 45,000 possible sequences, which is such a vast configuration space
that it would be impossible to exhaustively test the full configuration space before
the theoretical end of the universe. Engineered SB organisms are also
safety-critical systems, because they have the potential to cause harm to life or
the environment.
A core theme of this dissertation is that if SB is programming life through
manipulating DNA, then traditional computer science concepts and software
engineering principles could apply to SB and help create interdisciplinary
solutions to interdisciplinary problems. Perhaps feature models from software
product lines engineering could help synthetic biologists reason about the vast
configuration space and suggest pruning, sampling, and prioritization for wet-lab
experiments (see Chapter 4). Building assurance cases for safety-critical domains
such as avionics or nuclear energy could help synthetic biologists contemplate
safety and security features earlier in the design-build-test cycle and ultimately
provide evidence to support validation and verification of their new biological
7systems (see Chapter 3). From a domestic and international regulatory viewpoint,
computer scientists and cybersecurity experts could help synthetic biologists gain
better awareness of the weaknesses and capabilities of software and hardware
(see Chapter 5).
The design-build-test cycle comprises several different software and
hardware systems, all of which represent multiple attack surfaces for malicious
actors to exploit. Concepts from text-compression algorithms could help
distinguish which DNA sequences are toxic or non-toxic, including new ways to
visualize DNA motifs (see Chapter 6). Lastly, concepts of threat modeling and
fault-tree analysis could improve the security and integrity of the entire SB
process, including physical threats to facilities and the supply chain (see Chapter
7).
1.2 Contributions and Overview
This dissertation lays some of the foundation for validating and verifying the safety
and security of SEBOs. Although many SEBOs will be intended for use only
within production facilities, many will be intended for release for application within
the general environment. Traditional software engineering concepts about safety,
security, and reliability of systems could inform synthetic biologists about how to
incorporate similar concepts in their SEBO designs, hopefully early on in the
development process. It is possible to develop feature models, fault trees,
attack-defense trees, and assurance cases for SB designs. These concepts can
also help stakeholders navigate what is currently a confusing regulatory process.
Law and technology operate at very different paces. Technology frequently
advances so rapidly that laws enacted just a few years ago can seem ineffective
or short-sighted. If it is appropriate to apply software-engineering principles to SB,
then those principles could help lay foundations for a more pragmatic governance
8structure, both domestically and internationally.
As with any technology, SB has a dual-use nature, and it is important that
regulations aimed at SB effectively protect the public from malicious or negligent
activity without stifling legitimate, beneficial innovation. This dissertation provides
guidance and hopefully inspires greater interdisciplinary collaboration between
synthetic biologists and software engineers to address the very difficult
challenges related to designing, testing, building, validating, verifying, and
certifying SB organisms and their outputs.
Chapter 2 provides the general information about synthetic biology needed to
situate the rest of the chapters. Chapter 3 demonstrates how a traditional
software-engineering principle of an assurance case could apply to SEBOs. An
assurance case is a document which depicts safety and reliability architectures in
a tree-like graph, using natural language to meet specific goals supported by
strategies and evidence. Chapter 3 adds the concept of a sub-pattern called a
“recipe” to assist synthetic biologists with their construction. Typically, a synthetic
biologist would have no experience with or knowledge of assurance cases, and
the core idea is to use SB-specific domain knowledge to reduce the degrees of
freedom available when constructing an assurance case, as well as providing
specific guidance about what language is appropriate for filling in individual nodes.
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the traditional software-engineering concept of
feature models can be used to reason about the highly configurable nature of
synthetic biology as programming life. A feature model is an abstract
representation of core software modules used to show all of the possible software
products which could be developed, and all of those products comprise a software
product line. Feature models are depicted as trees which will often include
cross-tree restraints and dependencies. The intuition is that open-source DNA
parts repositories have much in common with open-source software repositories,
9and both can be represented as a software product line using feature models. It
should then be possible, through application of SB domain knowledge, to build a
feature model for SEBOs with respect to desired characteristics such as
cell-to-cell communication systems or safety features such as kill switches.
Chapter 5 explores the difficulties of regulating SB from a nation-state
perspective and suggests increased awareness and cooperation among all
stakeholders. Although there were several attempts for international cooperation
to regulate SB 10-15 years ago, today there exist few formal legal requirements to
ensure the safety and security of SB projects, whether it be at the industry,
academic, or do-it-yourself (DIY) level.
Chapter 6 presents a tool which extends upon related work to analyze DNA
sequences for detecting whether proteins are toxic or non-toxic. The tool analyzes
the frequencies of DNA motifs within larger sequences and provides some new
visualizations for this type of data. Chapter 7 suggests a new process for
research, industry, and government to leverage pre-existing safety and security
artifacts such as fault trees and attack-defense trees to semi-automatically
generate assurance cases for novel SB applications. The hope is that the process
of Chapter 7 will address some of the concerns raised in Chapter 5. Lastly,
Chapter 8 offers some areas for future research and a brief conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Synthetic Biology Basics
There is still no universally agreed upon definition of SB, but generally it is an
engineering discipline which emphasizes “the design and construction of new
biological entities such as enzymes, genetic circuits, and cells or the redesign of
existing biological systems.” [246] Through SB techniques, it is possible to
manipulate DNA sequences to create entirely new organisms with behavior and
characteristics never seen before in nature [12].
The ability to synthesize DNA sequences in any order and length offers
seemingly limitless potential for creating biological systems, similar to how
programming computers is ultimately engineering zeros and ones in any order
and length passed through a processing unit. Through SB, an engineer can code
the nucleotide bases adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T) in a
sequence which can be read and interpreted by living cells to trigger specific
behavior. Although SB designs are theoretically limited only by human creativity,
the most basic SB stand-alone functional unit is called a transcriptional unit [12].
Figure 2.1 shows an abstraction of a transcriptional unit using Synthetic Biology
Open Language (SBOL), [280] currently the most popular standard for describing
SB components for sharing and reuse [80].
The transcriptional unit is a composite part composed of four basic DNA
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Promoter
RBS
Coding Sequence
Terminator
Figure 2.1: SBOL model of a transcription unit.
parts. The promoter, also called a regulator, recruits cellular components to
initiate transcription which translates DNA into mRNA. A promoter is sometimes
referred to as a regulator because it can also inhibit transcription and act like an
inverse gate. Promoters can be either constitutive or inducible. A constitutive
promoter encourages transcription without any trigger, whereas an inducible
promoter can be triggered on or off depending upon the presence or absence of
specific proteins or other environmental conditions. The RBS marks the binding
location of the ribosome, which is the organic machine that translates the mRNA.
The coding sequence represents the desired protein to be produced. The
terminator marks the end of transcription of the protein coding sequence.
Figure 2.2: Information flow according to the central dogma of molecular
biology [121].
This is the basis for the “central dogma” of the flow of information in molecular
biology: DNA is transcribed into RNA and RNA is translated into proteins [80].
Figure 2.2 shows that the transcription process can be bi-directional, but it is
believed that reverse translation, or that a cell could convert a protein back into
RNA, is not possible based on current knowledge of cellular processes [121].
Typically, the transcriptional unit is synthesized into a plasmid, depicted as a
ring like the one shown in Figure 2.3. The map can include information about the
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subsequences required to build the plasmid, along with their individual functions.
Figure 2.3: Example plasmid map.
In a biological wet lab, an engineer can transform existing cells by inserting
copies of the plasmids. Experiments could involve any type of cells, but the most
commonly used cells are the K-12 strain of E. coli, which is considered to be
generally safe if exposed to healthy adult humans [268]. Once transformed, the
cells interpret the DNA of the plasmid as if it were its own native DNA. The cells
will use their own resources to execute the new program by transcribing the
plasmid DNA into RNA and translating the RNA into proteins which the cells
would not otherwise produce naturally [80].
The ability to make a cell produce a novel protein with a single plasmid, by
itself, offers a theoretically vast number of designs, because a plasmid is often
5,000bp in length. With an alphabet of four nucleotide bases, that means there
are 45,000 or 210,000 different ways to make even the most basic SB unit. One one
hand, 45,000 is an over-approximation because not every possible sequence of
5,000 DNA nucleotides will represent a meaningful message for cells to interpret.
On the other hand, it is an under-approximation because some cells can be
transformed with plasmids of 10,000bp or longer, and a design can include
multiple plasmids or plasmids which have multiple functions chained together [80],
including engineered communications with other types of cells in a
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sender-receiver-response system [220].
2.2 DNA Sequencing and Synthesis
Although any sequence can be synthesized, theoretically even randomly, SB
designs use parts which have been sequenced from nature. In 1977, Frederick
Sanger and colleagues introduced the first breakthrough technique for
sequencing DNA [189]. Sanger sequencing is expensive and slow, but an
accurate process. In the 1990s, J. Craig Venter and colleagues came up with the
idea of “shotgun” sequencing. Venter’s method could handle longer sequences
more quickly by chopping them up for parallel Sanger sequencing [80]. By 2008,
with the addition of high-speed computing and larger RAM capacities,
next-generation sequencing (NGS) emerged as the dominant technique [80].
In NGS, copies of longer sequences are generated through a process called
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and then chopped up into shorter chunks of
roughly 100bp. A dedicated machine reads the chunks, with each of the four
different base pairs emitting a different frequency of light from a chemical dye
[189]. The reads, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, must then be aligned
back together into the original sequence. The alignment process requires large
amounts of RAM, but is quicker than traditional Sanger sequencing [130]. The
improved speed of NGS has a tradeoff, however, of a higher error rate [233].
Once aligned, the output is simply a text file in the FASTA format shown in
Figure 6.2. The major open-source database for sequenced proteins is called
UniProt [7], where users can search over 160 million entries for proteins
sequenced from nature, such as those found in viruses, bacteria, plants, and
animals. Many sequences have additional information like protein structure or
characteristics.
An engineer can use a database like UniProt to find a protein with a desired
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Figure 2.4: Example of DNA test tubes.
function, but more information is needed to build a plasmid that will function inside
a transformed cell. Figure 2.1 shows that, at a minimum, the plasmid also needs a
promoter, an RBS, and a terminator. As an engineering discipline, SB
emphasizes reuse, modularity, and composability of parts. This has led to another
type of open-source database, a DNA parts database with annotated information
about specific biological functions and compatibility of each sequence [265]. The
DNA parts are often called “BioBricks,” a standardization concept introduced in
2003 by Tom Knight at MIT [120]. A BioBrick can theoretically be assembled in
any order, copied and pasted into a text file, and uploaded to a DNA synthesis
company which will use an automated manufacturing process to chemically build
the desired plasmid at a cost of less than $0.10 per base pair [80].
The company will ship an amount of the plasmid known as an aliquot in test
tubes like those shown in Figure 2.4. Then the engineer can create more copies
of the plasmid via PCR, also known as amplification. The last step is to choose a
host organism for transformation, a process which stresses cellular membranes to
open pores large enough to receive the plasmid, after which the cells will begin to
process the new DNA as if it were its own [80].
15
2.3 The iGEM Competition
As an example of how quickly SB is growing, the iGEM competition was first held
in the summer of 2004 at MIT with five U.S. teams, and the 2018 competition
hosted 340 teams from 42 countries, with more than 5,000 students participating
[249]. iGEM describes itself as a competition where teams “design, build, test,
and measure a system of their own design using interchangeable biological parts
and standard molecular biology techniques.” [259] Students design projects which
often address various regional problems such as pollution mitigation. Teams are
judged by community experts and can be awarded a medal (bronze, silver, and
gold) corresponding to the impact and contributions of their project. A gold medal
team must achieve several goals such as modeling their project, demonstrating
their work through experimentation, collaborating with other teams, addressing
safety concerns, improving pre-existing parts or projects, and contributing new
parts to the BioBrick database.
Teams work through the summer to complete their projects, some of which
are “quite sophisticated.” [156] The competition emphasizes collaborations with
other teams, and expects all participants to follow safety guidelines [269]. Work
must be done in labs which are certified to be safe for handling the equipment,
materials, and organisms [268].
It’s not just 5,000 students every year, of course, who are engaged in SB.
Billions of dollars are invested each year in private SB companies, and there are
individuals who engage in SB experimentation in their garages [156], an example
of which can be seen in Figure 5.1. The technology is moving rapidly, becoming
cheaper and easier to use.
This raises some concerns, because if anyone with $20,000 and a garage
can program life, then we will see “good” programs, “bad” programs, and “buggy”
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programs, regardless of programmer intent.
2.4 Software Engineering Concepts Applied to Synthetic Biology
More specific details are provided in the subsequent chapters, but this section
presents a brief explanation of the software engineering concepts used in this
dissertation.
2.4.1 Assurance Cases
Assurance cases, sometimes referred to as safety cases, are tree-like graphs
which feature nodes filled with natural-language text to support what should be a
“clear, comprehensive, and defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe
to operate in a particular context.” [116] Assurance cases are commonly accepted
and expected for safety-critical systems in Europe, where they were originally
invented in response to several deadly offshore drilling and railway accidents in
Britain during the late 1980s and early 1990s [116]. Since then, assurance cases
have found acceptance in other safety-critical domains such as avionics [51],
nuclear power [50], medical devices [110,112,136], and sub-sea
engineering [234].
Figure 2.5 shows what kind of text each type of node should contain, along
with the hierarchical structure of safety goals being supported by strategies,
sub-goals, and evidence. Chapters 3 and 7 provide more details about assurance
cases and their uses.
2.4.2 Feature Models
Feature models are also tree-like graphs which help software engineers reason
about the variability and commonality of software components within a large code
base, which is called a software product line [21]. The configuration space of a
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Figure 2.5: A generic assurance case using Goal Structuring
Notation [184].
large code base typically grows quite large. As an example, one code base of 250
features allowed roughly 2105 valid products [21].
Feature models have been applied to commercial software production to
handle mass customization of consumer products for embedded systems, mobile
devices, automobiles, and avionics [17,216]. They have also been applied to
open-source projects such as the Linux kernel [195] and GNU Compiler
Collection [85].
Figure 2.6: A generic feature model with legend [17].
Feature models help software engineers visually comprehend vast
configuration spaces by categorizing features as optional or mandatory, and
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whether zero, one, or many of a feature can be included to create a valid software
product. There can also be cross-tree constraints. Figure 2.6 shows a generic
feature model for a mobile phone and how to draw relationships between nodes.
If GPS is chosen as an option, then choosing a basic screen is prohibited by a
cross-tree constraint. If a camera is included, a high-resolution screen is required.
The structure of feature models allows software engineers to calculate how
many products can be generated from a large code base. Importantly, it allows a
determination of which products are valid, redundant, or violate constraints [21].
Chapter 4 provides further background on feature models.
2.4.3 Fault Trees and Attack-Defense Trees
Fault trees have been used since at least the 1970s to analyze the different ways
safety-critical software could enter failure modes [76]. The leaves of the fault tree
represent individual faults which should be mitigated to ensure a proper level of
safety. Nodes can have AND or OR relationships, meaning some failure modes
trigger based on two or more faults, while others trigger only upon the confluence
of two or more events. Fault trees can also assign probabilities and severities to
events as part of the analysis which allows engineers establish priorities for
mitigation strategies [179].
Figure 2.7 shows a small fault tree for an insulin pump. Unintentional
administration of insulin (F1) can occur either because of an incorrect command
from the controller (F2), or because an excess bolus of insulin was administered
(F3). The excess bolus can be caused by too many requests from the user (F4)
only if the safeguard against excessive requests fails (F5).
Attack-defense trees look to verify system security, and usually assume an
intelligent actor as an adversary [187]. Attack nodes, typically in red, represent
the various ways an adversary could compromise the system security, whether
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Figure 2.7: An example fault tree based on [111].
physically or logically. A basic example for compromising a network server is
shown in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: An example attack-defense tree [123].
The three nodes under the root node of Attack on Server indicate alternative,
independent attacks. The arc over the two nodes under Insider Attack indicate
both nodes must occur to accomplish that attack. Ideally, the leaves of the tree
will be mitigation nodes, typically in green, appended directly below the attack
leaves. As with fault trees, attack nodes can include quantitative aspects such as
probabilities and severities for prioritizing mitigation strategies [122]. More
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information about fault trees and attack-defense trees appears in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 3
Facilitating Assurance Cases Through Domain-Specific
Patterns
Assurance cases have grown in popularity to reason about safety-critical systems.
They are commonly used in domains such as aviation, nuclear energy, railways,
and offshore drilling [22,68,117,197]. Recent work has proposed using
assurance cases in non-traditional domains where engineering safety is also
paramount such as SB and medical devices [44,110]. The discipline of SB is
safety-critical because the SEBOs and their outputs have the potential to cause
harm to life or the environment, leading to the need to assure their safety. Recent
work has suggested assurance cases are appropriate for this purpose [44].
An assurance case is built in a hierarchical tree structure, with the root node
being the main claim of safety supported below by arguments that are supported
by evidence [22]. Claims are “assertions put forward for general acceptance” and
are “typically statements about a property of the system or some subsystem.” [22]
Evidence is “used as the basis of the justification of the claim” and “may include
the design, the development process, prior field experience, testing, source code
analysis or formal analysis.” [22] Arguments “link the evidence to the claim” along
with “validation for the scientific and engineering laws used.” [22]
A generic example is shown in Figure 3.1 and provides a reference key for
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), the most common standard for depicting
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Figure 3.1: A generic assurance case using GSN notation [223].
assurance cases [223]. Claims are rectangles labeled with the letter “C,” and the
primary claim is the root node. Assumptions about those claims are drawn with
ovals labeled with an “A.” If claims have specific contexts or environments, they
are rectangles with rounded corners with “Ctxt” for a label. Finally, strategies are
parallelograms labeled with an “S” and serve as the basis for arguments
supported by circles of evidence labeled with an “E.” A diamond indicates further
evidence is needed to support the claim.
Complex systems require complex assurance cases and they may be difficult
for novice users to understand and build. One way to make assurance cases
easier to share and use across domains has been to abstract similarities for reuse
via patterns [53]. Patterns are meta-models of common argument structures and
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can be described and catalogued for retrieval and reuse. While useful for an
expert in building assurance cases, these patterns may not be usable by a novice
who may have too many degrees of freedom to concretize an abstraction.
This chapter proposes providing better guidance through a different level of
abstraction, a template-like model called an “assurance recipe.” The user is
provided a structure and pattern for an assurance case and is guided to select
“ingredients” for a set of options based on domain knowledge and expertise. The
recipes can be further customized for specific domains and then parameterized
for easy user instantiation, such as the non-traditional domain of SB where users
will not normally be familiar with building assurance cases.
The first section is a pre-study to understand whether the requirement for
commonality exists in SB. The subjects of the pre-study are teams who earned a
gold medal in the iGEM competition between 2015 and 2017 to understand
whether there is a similar set of common approaches typically used for safety.
Information and data manually extracted from those subjects was used in
development of common recipes. Finally, this chapter presents a feasibility study
to demonstrate how end-users could apply the recipes in practice. The recipes
proposed are based on the emerging safety-critical discipline of SB [188], but the
concepts could also be useful for other safety-critical disciplines.
3.1 Background and Related Work
Researchers have recognized a need for modularity and reuse of patterns which
can facilitate design and understanding of assurance cases. To address the
difficulty of assuring and certifying electronics systems in the aerospace industry,
Ruiz et al. [183] suggest combining Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) as a way to
represent, retrieve, and reuse previously assured safety cases. CBR analysis is
based on the theory that similar problems have similar solutions. Well-developed
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patterns should help develop best practices because it will be easier to share
domain knowledge and rationales. Indeed, “experts in technical fields such as
medicine, engineering, planning, and finance rely on past cases to generate
hypotheses about new situations.” [183]
For general safety-critical domains Conmy and Bate [45] propose a method
to understand reuse of software components in different contexts, such as when a
software module needs to be verified on new hardware. A key insight is that
evidence used to verify a software module in one context is not necessarily
sufficient or appropriate in another. They combine Component-Based Software
Engineering (CBSE) concepts with argument fragments to guide the user.
Hawkins and Kelly [92] present the concept of a catalog of argument patterns
to describe claims that could apply to any software assurance case. Similar to
software design, software argument patterns are abstractions of common
strategies or best practices. This concept was expanded by Szczygielska and
Jarzebowicz [200] who proposed an online repository for assurance case patterns
with a focus on universal application and uniformity across different industry
domains for high-integrity systems.
Figure 3.2: A high-level pattern based on Denney and Pai.
The recipes in this work are influenced heavily by the work of Denney and Pai
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who developed a foundation for a theory of assurance patterns, or a pattern for
patterns [53]. Their work formalizes definitions of argument structures and
argument patterns, and provides an algorithm for instantiating their patterns. The
recipes in this chapter are based on their Claim Formalization Pattern shown in
Figure 3.2.
3.2 Pre-study
For the pre-study, this chapter examined three years of projects from the iGEM
competition, which is a yearly competition for teams of students from high school
through to graduate school. This competition has grown rapidly in popularity, with
314 teams from over 40 countries in 2017 [102]. The iGEM competition provides
a plentiful source of real-world projects because teams are encouraged to share
information in an open-source database. Teams must also explicitly discuss safety
of their projects, whereas private industry or academic institutions might choose
to protect their designs through confidentiality or intellectual property laws.
Teams can attempt to earn a bronze, silver, or gold medal for satisfying
increasingly stringent criteria. Gold-medal teams must accomplish Integrated
Human Practices, which asks teams to “consider whether their projects are safe,
responsible, and good for the world.” [255] The pre-study is limited to gold-medal
teams from 2015-2017 based on the assumption they addressed safety to earn
the gold medal.
The most common cellular chassis for iGEM projects is the K-12 strain of E.
coli, a bacterium which does not inherently produce toxins and can be handled in
a Safety Level One lab. By far, most experiments are performed in a Safety Level
One lab using organisms which are generally regarded as safe (GRAS) [278].
However, even the relatively safe K-12 strain of E. coli could pose safety-critical
risks outside the lab, because SEBOs have added functionality and behavior and
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can evolve or adapt to environmental stress. Also, iGEM teams are not required to
perform the extensive testing needed to ensure their safety. Indeed, “it would be
difficult for any team to gain real-world biosafety approval for their applications
(e.g., for medical use or environmental release).” [90]
3.2.1 Categorization Methodology
The safety pages of gold-medal iGEM teams from 2015-2017 provided 334
projects which fell into the following categories of safety features.1
• Containment (Con): the SEBOs and their products are safely contained in
the lab and are not intended for release into the environment.
• Kill-switch (KS): upon unwanted evolution or mutation, a process is triggered
to actively kill the SEBOs, often through lysis of cell membranes.
• Auxotrophy (Aux): the SEBOs cannot survive without the presence of a
specific chemical or food source.
• Degradation (Deg): the SEBOs or their products degrade naturally over time
when exposed to certain environmental conditions.
• Sterility (Ster): the SEBOs’ offspring are engineered to be sterile.
• GRAS: the organisms and their products are in Risk Group 1 as defined by
the FDA or the NIH.
Some of the categorization required making subjective determinations about
which safety features were used. Also, some teams used terminology
inconsistently, such as the 2016 Wageningen Team which described auxotrophy
as a kill-switch [275]. These subjective decisions represent a threat to the validity
1A spreadsheet of the teams is available at https://sites.google.com/view/splc-dnafeatures/emse,
under the Journal Version (EMSE), RQ2.
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of the categories and statistics, but nevertheless should be a relatively fair
representation of the 334 projects.
Year # Gold Medals KS Con GRAS Aux Deg Ster
2015 114 7.02% 14.04% 50.00% 3.51% 1.75% 0.88%
2016 111 12.61% 20.72% 43.24% 2.70% 5.41% 0.00%
2017 109 13.76% 16.51% 44.04% 6.42% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 3.1: Top safety features from recent iGEM competitions.
Year Gold Medals Awarded Auxotrophy Degradation Sterility
2015 114 3.51% 1.75% 0.88%
2016 111 2.70% 5.41% 0.00%
2017 109 6.42% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 3.2: Less-common safety features from recent iGEM competitions.
In fact, some teams acknowledged on their safety pages that even though
they used organisms or materials which were GRAS, there nevertheless was
some unknown level of risk associated with their projects. One team stated: “If the
experiment did not proceed carefully that result [sic] in the leak of the culture
medium, the bacteria may breed at a considerable speed especially for the
human cell culture medium and serum we would use in our lab. Thus it will
contaminate the lab.” [271]
Other examples of teams expressing doubts or concerns about safety
include:
• “[A]ny improper disposal of ccdB protein and plasmids containing ccdB gene
will pose serious results to the natural bacterial communities . . . ” [273]
• “Since the toxic proteins we choose are relative [sic] new, we cannot find
their degradation period, degradation condition and more information related
to safety. Thus we design a series of future experiments.” [276]
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• “If you ask us whether our project is safe or not, we will say yes and it won’t
do any harm to humans and the environment.” [251]
• “[I]ntegration of this modified probiotic strain into patients’ gut floras however
would require a whole lot of other biosafety considerations . . . ” [260]
• “When we consider this in the aspect of evolution, we cannot predict the
possibility that there’s an unknown toxin can be produced by PCC6803 . . . ”
[270]
• “The pathway responsible for breaking down naphthalene was extracted
from the Pseudomonas putida PpG7. This organism is safety class 1, but
since there have been some cases where this bacteria have infected
humans we took extra safety precautions when working with it; it was
handled and kept in a fume hood.” [274]
• “There is a non-zero probability of our strains mutating to a pathogenic
serotype.” [277]
Most teams base the safety of their projects on the mere fact their organisms
are GRAS, but some teams add safety features into their projects. Table 3.1
shows usage of safety features. The percentages do not add up to 100% for a few
reasons. First, many teams did not complete their webpage stubs for the Safety
category, or it was otherwise unclear what their approach for safety was. It is likely
those teams were relying on GRAS Only as their safety feature, meaning the
percentages from Table 3.1 for GRAS Only are likely under-reported. Second,
some of the teams considered more than one safety feature, such as the 2017
IONIS-PARIS team’s “four walls” design [256]. Finally, some teams entered
projects which did not involve SEBOs directly, but instead were in silico
contributions, such as developing or improving software or hardware.
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3.3 Assurance Recipes
The concept of an assurance recipe begins with a pattern, specifically the Claim
Formalization Pattern from Denney and Pai [53]. This section provides recipes for
the two most-common safety features in Table 3.1. The first, the Containment
Recipe, assumes SEBOs are not intended for release into the environment. The
second, the Safety Mechanism Recipe, assumes SEBOs will have applications
outside of the laboratory or production facility.
3.3.1 Containment Recipe
This recipe places focus on safety levels and associated risks, and is shown in
Figure 3.3(a). It is intended to address the four different lab safety levels and the
risks associated with organisms requiring those safety levels. The assumption is
that a competent government agency has accurately declared the organisms to
be from a specific risk group. The evidence needed will mostly be documentation
of adequate training, along with proof of adequate logical and physical security
measures needed to certify the lab. Table 3.3 suggests ingredients for the recipe
from which the user can select the appropriate choices.
Variable Ingredients
cf :: containmentFacility
1. Safety Level One Lab
2. Safety Level Two Lab
3. Safety Level Three Lab
4. Safety Level Four Lab
rg :: riskGroup
1. Risk Group One
2. Risk Group Two
3. Risk Group Three
4. Risk Group Four
ht :: hazardType
1. cannot cause disease in healthy adults;
2. can cause treatable or preventable disease in humans;
3. can cause serious disease in humans which might not have a treatment or
vaccine;
4. can cause serious disease in humans which has no known treatment or vaccine
Table 3.3: Suggested ingredients for the Containment Recipe.
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Figure 3.3: The Containment Recipe.
3.3.2 Safety Mechanism Recipe
The recipe in Figure 3.4(b) addresses the most-common SEBO safety
mechanisms. The assumption is that the SEBOs will be released into the
environment and that they pose some risk of harm. The evidence will heavily rely
on wet-lab experimental data. The safety and security of the SEBOs are included
as sub-goals, but there may not be sufficient experimental evidence to support
them. A node which does not have sufficient evidence could be annotated to
indicate which laboratory experiments are needed to support the sub-goals. Table
3.4 suggests ingredients for the Containment Recipe.
3.4 Feasibility
This section assesses whether the recipes can be instantiated based on four
iGEM projects. The first is the 2017 University of Nebraska - Lincoln (UNL) team.
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Figure 3.4: The Safety Mechanism Recipe.
Variable Ingredients
sm :: safetyMechanism
1. Kill-switch
2. Auxotrophy
3. Degradation
4. Sterility
u :: usage 1. The SEBOs2. Only the SEBOs’ outputs
se :: specificEnvironment
1. Soil
2. Water table
3. [Specific species habitat]
4. Atmosphere
5. Rivers
6. Freshwater rivers or lakes
7. Saltwater lakes or oceans
8. Human body
9. [Non-human] body
sp :: specificParameter
1. [Temperature Range]
2. [pH Range]
3. [Aerobic/Anaerobic] environment
4. [Natural/Specific frequencies/Absence] of light
5. [Presence/Absence] of nutrients
6. [Altitude range]
Table 3.4: Suggested ingredients for the Safety Mechanism Recipe.
They thoroughly documented the safety training each member had to achieve
before working in the lab, which provided a logical source for instantiation of the
Containment Recipe. The UNL team listed themselves as working in a Safety
Level 1 lab, with organisms from Risk Group 1, and were thus the first
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hazardType. For evidence, the students needed to demonstrate they followed
protocols for proper containment. Their documentation would be appropriate to fill
in evidence nodes such as Sn2. They wrote: “We took a total of 6 safety modules
including a Biosafety Level 1 course before we were allowed to work in the lab. All
modules that required a quiz to be taken had to be completed with 80%
proficiency.” [262]. The assurance case instantiation is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Assurance case fragment instantiation for the Containment
Recipe.
Kill switches are the most-common approaches to non-containment safety,
and Figure 3.6 shows an instantiation of the Safety Mechanism Recipe based on
the Hok/Sok kill switch implemented by a University of Maryland team [261]. The
key feature is the evidence based on wet-lab experiments showing that the kill
switch will trigger within 30 seconds of mutation.
The next-most common safety feature is to engineer auxotrophy into SEBOs.
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Figure 3.6: Assurance case fragment instantiation for the Safety
Mechanism Recipe for a kill switch.
Figure 3.7 shows an assurance case fragment based on the 2016 Wageningen
team [275] which implemented an auxotrophic system based on prior work [149].
The team designed SEBOs to produce a chemical which helps bees defend
against mites. The SEBOs were engineered to require a synthetic amino acid
called BipA to survive, a compound which beekeepers could add into sugar water
for feeding a bee colony. If the SEBOs were to escape the beehive, they would die
within 72 hours without BipA.
Last is an assurance case for degradation based on the 2016 Formosa team
which developed a pesticide called Pantide [254]. Because it was a novel toxin,
the team performed experiments to determine that it sufficiently degrades within
two hours of exposure to natural light at 36.8° C. This is shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.7: Assurance case fragment instantiation for the Safety
Mechanism Recipe for auxotrophy.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the idea of an assurance recipe and demonstrated how it
can be applied in the non-traditional domain of synthetic biology. Although the
assurance recipes are based on the most-common safety features of SEBOs from
iGEM projects, they are intended for general application to any SEBOs, and
should be helpful for other safety-critical disciplines. Assurance recipes and
ingredients can facilitate use and reuse by domain experts who lack expertise
with building assurance cases.
35
Figure 3.8: Assurance case fragment instantiation for the Safety
Mechanism Recipe for degradation.
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Chapter 4
Building Feature Models from Synthetic Biology BioBricks.
The most basic design in SB is the transcription unit shown in Figure 2.1. A
transcription unit is comprised, in sequence, of four basic DNA parts: a promoter,
an RBS, a protein coding sequence, and a terminator. An engineer browsing the
iGEM registry would find 3,912 promoters [263], 747 RBSs [264], 9,699 protein
sequences [252], and 503 terminators [272] from which to choose. That means
there are 3, 912× 747× 9, 699× 503 possible combinations, which is over 14
trillion, for the most basic design in SB. This is ultimately a very low boundary for
the actual number of possible combinations, because a transcription unit can be
5,000bp or more, which is 45,000 possible combinations, a number far larger than
the number of estimated hydrogen atoms in the universe (1080) [194].
The DNA parts are often described as LEGO® pieces that can be combined
in many ways to form new genetic devices. However, these LEGO® pieces come
with no building or assembly instructions, and often lack important information for
reusability. An engineer might begin a project by developing a blueprint for their
intended SEBO and behavior, and plan the type of features their system should
have. An example of a feature would be a part that produces a fluorescent protein,
visible to the naked eye, in the presence of a particular chemical. The engineer
would need to find the corresponding parts in a repository or research literature.
However, a specific architecture is required to ensure the various features work
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together, and this can require significant domain knowledge and expertise.
Similar to the BioBrick repository for programming SEBOs with modular and
reusable parts, current software development practices rely heavily on code
modularity and reusability. Programmers create open-source projects
emphasizing plug-and-play interfaces for implementing code in a wide variety of
applications. Open-source repositories such as GitHub have emerged where
developers can reuse, and even help improve, code libraries. Well written libraries
and components should reflect low coupling and high cohesion, a core tenet of
software engineering [97].
However, even the best code libraries can become extremely large and
difficult to maintain. As new packages are added to existing projects, it is not easy
to determine whether prior dependencies and constraints are still valid, or
whether new ones were added. To address these issues, software product line
(SPL) engineering has become a best practice for modeling and managing
families of software systems. The SPL community has turned to open-source
systems and embraced concepts of commonality and variability to define
open-source product lines [195]. Montalvillo and Dı´az have proposed techniques
to aid SPL practices within GitHub [154].
Because large open-source code bases and a large DNA parts database
present similar challenges for engineers hoping to use them in their designs, this
chapter explores whether the SPL practice of feature modeling can be applied to
SB and the open-source database of DNA BioBricks.
4.1 Background
The process of engineering SEBOs starts with a model which is then
implemented into strands of DNA to be inserted into a living cell. The organism is
like a compiler: it treats the inserted DNA code as its own native DNA, and then
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translates it to machine-level code which is transcribed into proteins which
perform or enable different functions. While machine code for computers is written
in 1s and 0s, the machine code for biology is written in the four DNA bases of
adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G).
This analogy of programming biology is not a new concept. There is a
programming language called the Synthetic Biology Open Language (SBOL)
which defines a common way to represent biological designs [280]. Researchers
have used SB to enable: 1) a context-free grammar using BioBricks [31]; 2)
automated design of genetic circuits with NOT/NOR gates [164]; and 3) bacterial
networks to use DNA for data storage [23,201]. Other SB organic programs have
achieved traditional computer science constructs such as: 1) a genetic oscillator
[61]; 2) a genetic toggle switch [83]; and 3) a time-delay circuit [222].
The discipline of SB breaks down biological processes into smaller functions,
each of which can be represented by a DNA part. These parts can be assembled
in various combinations to make new functions. The largest open-source
repository of DNA parts is called the Registry of Standard Parts [265] which
contains over 45,000 entries. Teams from the iGEM competition submit their parts
to the registry with various information about their usage and efficacy. Although
iGEM teams are the most frequently documented users of the repository, anyone
can search it to find appropriate parts for their designs.
iGEM describes itself as a competition where teams “design, build, test, and
measure a system of their own design using interchangeable biological parts and
standard molecular biology techniques.” Each year about 6,000 students
participate, designing projects which often address local problems such as
pollution mitigation. Teams are judged by community experts and can be awarded
a medal, either bronze, silver, or gold, depending on the impact and contributions
of their project. Gold-medal teams must achieve several goals such as modeling
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their project, demonstrating their work through experimentation, collaborating with
other teams, addressing safety concerns, improving pre-existing parts or projects,
and contributing new parts.
4.1.1 Motivating Example
The following motivating example is derived from a case study demonstrating the
potential of SPL engineering for SB. A kill switch is a safety mechanism which
triggers cellular death, typically by engineering cells to produce proteins which
destroy cellular membranes. Common triggers include exposure to specific
chemicals, temperature ranges, pH levels, or frequencies of light. The feature
model for the kill switch in Figure 4.1 was developed by manually reviewing all of
the wiki pages from the 110 teams who earned a gold medal in the 2017 iGEM
competition, and is the same set used for prior work on assurance cases [70]. Of
those 110 teams, 14 mentioned some type of kill switch in their design. Thus, a
complete model for all possible kill switches would be much larger, and Figure 4.1
only represents a small subset of the total configuration space.
If a synthetic biologist were to do a free-text search for “kill switch” (without
the quote marks in the search box) at the registry website, the query produces
145 results [257]. A similar search for “kill-switch” (again without quote marks)
produces 423 hits [258]. The page on parts by type for “cell death” features 51
parts [253], and the Biosafety page has a list of 25 kill-switch parts [266]. It is not
obvious which search produces the most relevant results, and it would require
manual inspection of each result to determine whether the parts were suitable for
the intended design.
What if, instead of starting from scratch, the synthetic biologist begins this
process with the feature model in Figure 4.1? From this model, users could
quickly see the architecture of their system. They would understand that a kill
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Figure 4.1: A feature model for a kill switch.
switch is comprised of four basic parts: a promoter, an RBS, a coding sequence,
and a terminator. Instead of having to look at hundreds of possible parts, and not
knowing exactly what to type in a free-text search box, users could see that there
are two important points of variability for a kill switch: the trigger type and the kill
type.
If users wanted to test the effectiveness of different types of kill switches in a
specific system, they could slice this model to get a specific set of products.
Moreover, slicing the model would become more important as more features are
added. Users could also design experiments to test products which have not yet
been implemented or analyzed in a laboratory. Upon completion of a successful
experiment, users could add data and notes as annotations.
This type of information is not readily available within the iGEM parts registry.
If teams successfully implement a kill switch, they may or may not share their
results as free text on their webpages with specific information about the parts
they used, and teams do not provide consistent levels of documentation or
specificity. There is no central source for this information and locating it would
require several manual searches.
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4.2 Related Work
This study follows a long line of research on software product lines, and does not
attempt to summarize all of that work. There are several good surveys on this
topic [18,205]. Product-line engineering has been applied in many emerging
domains recently including drones and nanodevices [42,145]. There is also a
push towards open-source product lines [142,154,195] and the concept of a
software ecosystem, where the community modifies and customizes product lines
using a common platform and look [173].
The most similar work is that of Lutz et al. [145] who studied a family of DNA
nanodevices. While they also looked at DNA, they studied chemical reaction
networks (CRNs), rather than a living synthetically engineered organism. Their
line of organic programming leveraged CRNs, which are sets of concurrent
equations that can be compiled into single strands of DNA [229]. CRNs have
been shown to be Turing complete and are not part of living organisms because
they do not require transcription and translation of DNA code [64,67].
Other researchers have examined relationships within the BioBrick repository
from a network perspective to gain an understanding of its complexity, and they
also consider it to be a software ecosystem [214]. This case study is different
from prior work by showing how domain engineering can build a family of
synthetic biology products to be analyzed and reasoned about using traditional
SPL techniques.
4.3 Organic Software Product Lines
The SPL community has asked whether open-source applications such as the
Linux Kernel should be considered product lines given that they were not
managed and developed in the traditional manner [142,195]. The consensus has
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been that these applications should be considered product lines, and the
community now has a broader view of what constitutes an SPL. Turning to SB and
organic programs, it seems logical to ask whether there could be a mapping
between traditional SPL engineering to enable managed development and reuse
of DNA parts.
Clements and Northrop stated that the output of domain engineering should
contain: 1) a product-line scope; 2) a set of core assets; and 3) a production plan
[43]. In application engineering the production plan and its scope help build and
test individual products. The kill-switch model focuses primarily on domain
engineering, but there are tangential concepts related to application engineering
through the context of organic programs.
4.3.1 Assets
Assets in traditional product lines can include a software architecture, reusable
software components, performance models, test plans and test cases, and other
design documents. Organic programs have similar elements. One is usage of
SBOL to define the functionality of assembled DNA parts, and this serves as an
important design document for individual features. The SBOL models can be
composed and aggregated into larger composite models, and should include the
specific DNA sequences required for each part, as well as a visual representation
(e.g., Figure 2.1).
The DNA sequence itself is the reusable software component. Like code it is
not tangible, but must be implemented as a program and compiled down to a
machine level representation. DNA can be synthesized into a physical strand to
be inserted into a compiler (the living organism) for translation to machine level
code (via the biological process of transcription of DNA via RNA into proteins).
Other assets such as test cases and test plans can be constructed which define
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either laboratory experiments or virtual simulations. Both help users evaluate a
program’s expected, versus observed, functionality. Additional assets in the form
of design documents and documentation can be provided such as safety cases
[70] and system-level architectures expressed through tools such as GenoCAD
[31].
4.3.2 Domain Engineering
During domain engineering, users define the product-line scope by choosing a
family of behavior such as a type of molecular communication or computation.
When inserted into their host organisms at specific binding sites, the sets of DNA
sequences that perform desired functionality define unique sets of products which
exhibit commonality and variability. Finally, a production plan can be created in
combination with a feature model and constraints. The feature model and
constraints show how the DNA parts, as features, form a family of products, and
annotations can include experimental notes on expected environmental
conditions or other assumptions that are required for the program to run correctly.
4.3.3 Application Engineering
Application engineering involves combining the expected parts using standard
DNA cloning techniques for insertion into a living organism [177]. As with
traditional product lines, the engineer must comply with any constraints and
compose only those products which are validly defined in the feature model,
otherwise unexpected behavior may occur. As in traditional software, some
constraints may be hard-coded into the program, while some may represent a
domain expectation instead.
Thu¨m, et al. [205] in their survey of product lines discuss different
implementations of product lines and analyses that can be performed at both the
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family and variability level. Organic product lines are another type of
implementation and we can utilize common analyses and techniques from SPL
engineering in this domain.
4.3.4 Case Study
Next is a case study to evaluate the feasibility of using product-line engineering to
help synthetic biologists. The case study evaluates two research questions:
• RQ1: Does a DNA repository have functions with the characteristics of a
software product line?
• RQ2: If the answer to RQ1 is yes, then is it possible to build feature models
representing families of products from an existing DNA repository? If the
repository has sets of products with software product line characteristics, it
should be possible to use them to make a feature model.
The subject repository is the Registry of Standard Biological Parts as
described in Section 7.2. The registry represents the largest open-source DNA
repository with 47,934 parts and continues to grow by an average 2,995 parts
each year. The parts are sorted into ten common biological functions: biosafety,
biosynthesis, cell-to-cell signaling and quorum sensing, cell death, coliroid,
conjugation, motility and chemotaxis, odor production and sensing, DNA
recombinations, and viral vectors. This study focuses on biosafety, a subset of
which includes kill switches. Based on these functions and characteristics, RQ1 is
answered in the affirmative.
The feature model shown in Figure 4.1 represents manual review of all 2017
iGEM teams who earned a gold medal. The “Trigger” section will likely be the
most interesting for synthetic biologists because they will want to engineer their
kill switches to activate only under certain conditions. There are many other
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possible designs for kill switches which are not represented in this model, but it
serves as a starting point for further discussion. Even this small model represents
882 valid products.
Kill switches in the model can be triggered under several different conditions:
1) temperature ranges; 2) presence or absence of specific chemicals; 3) low pH
levels; or 4) exposure to specific frequencies of natural light. Each of those trigger
conditions ends in leaf nodes which are the BioBrick IDs correlating to actual DNA
sequences. The promoters, RBSs, coding sequences, and terminators show
which BioBricks could be used to complete a transcription unit for a kill switch.
The “Visualization” branch is optional and provides visual evidence to the naked
eye that the kill switch is working through production of fluorescent proteins. The
feature model shown in Figure 4.1 properly captures the characteristics of the
BioBricks associated with kill switches, thus RQ2 is answered in the affirmative.
4.4 Conclusion
Feature models such as the one shown in Figure 4.1 can help synthetic biologists
guide the design-build-test process by making it easier to more quickly find
appropriate parts for their SEBOs. This shows that feature models, a traditional
software-engineering concept, can also be applied to a non-traditional domain
such as SB.
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Chapter 5
The Need for Soft Law to Regulate Synthetic Biology1
This chapter examines some of the regulatory issues regarding SB, with particular
concern that despite several international collaborative efforts 10-15 years ago,
there currently are few formal legal requirements with respect to SB. Part of the
problem may be that SB is a challenging, interdisciplinary field, and regulators do
not have requisite expertise to adequately and efficiently regulate an emerging
and rapidly advancing technology. It is difficult to fine-tune legal requirements so
that they do not stifle legitimate progress, yet in turn provide enough protection
and transparency to satisfy the public. The dual-use nature of SB suggests the
threats to life and the environment could be significant, but so far, there has been
little more than discussion of potential threats.
In 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century issued its
Phase I report to draw attention to the most likely trends or emerging threats, one
of which was that: “[r]apid advances in information and biotechnologies will create
new vulnerabilities for U.S. security.” [91] Although this report did not use the
phrase “synthetic biology” (SB), the report was concerned with the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), whether nuclear, chemical, or biological. If
the report had issued ten years later, the authors would have probably specifically
1This chapter was written for Jurimetrics, the law journal of the Science & Technology Law
section of the American Bar Association [69]. The writing style incorporates opinions and
arguments which might otherwise be unexpected or inappropriate for scientific papers.
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mentioned SB, a new technology with dual-uses which could help proliferate
biological WMDs.
In fact, in 2010 (eleven years later), the Presidential Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Issues directly assessed the dual-use nature of SB and
recommended “that the field of synthetic biology can proceed responsibly by
embracing a middle ground–an ongoing process of prudent vigilance that
carefully monitors, identifies, and mitigates potential and realized harms over
time. Responsible stewardship requires clarity, coordination, and accountability
across the government. While new agencies, offices, or authorities are not
necessary at this time, the Executive Office of the President should lead an
interagency process to identify and clarify, if needed, existing oversight authorities
and ensure that the government is informed on an ongoing basis about
developments, risks, and opportunities as this field grows. This process must be
undertaken by an office with sufficient authority to bring together all parts of the
government with a stake in synthetic biology and be sufficiently authoritative to
effectively engage or oversee engagement with foreign governments.” [174]
This recommendation implicitly suggests that in 2010 there was no need for
new federal statutes, federal agencies, or any formally binding international
agreements. Instead, the guidance was simply “prudent vigilance” and
“responsible stewardship” within and among existing federal agencies which might
have authority to regulate SB. If serious concerns, risks, or threats were to arise,
stakeholders from all parts of the U.S. government would take the lead
domestically and internationally. Given the state of the art of SB at the time, this
approach seemed logical.
Researchers argued that SB was not as easy or accessible to the
do-it-yourself community (DIYers) as some had warned, and the claim that SB
parts were modular and easily composable like building blocks was inappropriate.
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“The problem is that many parts have not been characterized well. They haven’t
always been tested to show what they do, and even when they have, their
performance can change with different cell types or under different laboratory
conditions.” [127]
Also, it is somewhat misleading for SB proponents to analogize the modular
DNA parts to LEGO® pieces, as if they can simply be snapped together in an
easy plug-and-play design [127]. The reality is that many parts are not
documented or tested well enough to readily incorporate them into new projects,
especially if being used in different chassis organisms, and it is difficult to
engineer novel cellular behavior that is truly orthogonal to its native DNA code
[127]. Researchers have complained that it is often nearly impossible to
reproduce anyone else’s SB experiments due to lack of full DNA sequence
sharing or full descriptions of the genetic networks [170]. Lastly, transforming
biology into an engineering discipline is not a straightforward task, because life is
not static like a traditional mechanical device [190]. The goals of abstraction,
modularity, and standardization have more fluidity when applied to living cells
[190]. Notably, cells can mutate and evolve, and we do not have a complete
understanding of the underlying biological systems being manipulated [190].
However, many of these drawbacks and challenges have been mitigated over
that last ten years through better sharing of information and open-source
databases of standardized parts using standardized formats, including more
complete documentation to facilitate reproducibility of experiments [151]. There is
active work by biologists and computer scientists to improve on a standardized
language called Synthetic Biology Open Language (SBOL), which is now
commonly used to describe basic DNA parts. SBOL allows research groups to
more easily replicate experiments and share wet-lab results or distribute work
from different stages of the design-build-test cycle to allow for specialization
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among various areas of expertise [80]. Standardization efforts such as SBOL
allow for the reuse of previously validated designs, improve the ability to publish
results, and help reduce ambiguity or vagueness in definitions. Today, SB has
matured into an engineering discipline compared to the science of biology [80].
Consider that every year, high school and college students from around the
world learn basic SB safety and skills for the iGEM competition held in Boston by
MIT [102]. The competition has grown rapidly in popularity, with 314 teams from
over 40 countries in 2017, including a team from Ghana which was able to make
its own incubator using LEGO® pieces [103]. Emerging DNA synthesis
companies allow researchers to order synthetic genes coded in uploaded text files
and receive the genes “within a matter of days.” [56]
A decade of progress has produced several real-world SB successes, such
as the synthesis of artemisinin, an anti-malarial drug which is difficult to produce
naturally [168]. Medical research has improved through studies of microRNA
strands (roughly 22bp) which are opening new avenues for SB to improve or
create novel gene therapies for diseases which were otherwise considered
untreatable [119]. The world’s ever-increasing demands for energy could be
mitigated through industrial production of biofuels, something which was though
possible back in 2008 [131], but now seems ever more likely [108].
However, each beneficial innovation has a theoretical dual-use counter. The
ability to synthesize drugs is itself a specific dual-use technology, as it is now
possible to synthesize opioids in yeast [79], which could result in synthesized
heroin or fentanyl [59]. Gene therapies could open the door to the creation of
specialized diseases targeting specific individuals [96]. The agricultural sector
could face novel or more pathogenic strains of existing bacteria or viruses which
could damage traditional biofuel sources such as ethanol and soybeans [225].
Despite last decade’s rapid advances and lowering of costs to perform DIY
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SB experiments for academia, industry, and DIY enthusiasts, it appears “prudent
vigilance” and “responsible stewardship” were more like “laissez-faire” in
application. That is, from 2010-2018, there was little or no formal governmental
response to SB dual-uses. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to consider SB
dual-uses as a U.S.-only problem or inappropriate to assume the U.S. will lead
effective international discussions regarding SB.
It is easy to understand the calls for regulation. For example, the horsepox
virus was recently reconstructed by piecing it together from several biosynthesis
companies. “This is clearly an example of dual-use research, and observations
like these pose significant challenges for public health authorities. Most viruses
could be assembled nowadays using reverse genetics, and these methods have
been combined with gene synthesis technologies to assemble poliovirus and
other extinct pathogens like the 1918 influenza strain. Given that the sequence of
variola virus has been known since 1993, our studies show that it is clearly
accessible to current synthetic biology technology, with important implications for
public health and biosecurity.” [165]
Another recent SB project funded by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) raised dual-use concerns because it investigates
whether insects can more rapidly disperse genetically modified viruses to alter
crop genomes [178]. Although the stated purpose of the research is to develop
better food security against bioweapons, some researchers note that the
genetically modified viruses spread by insects could actually alter crops in
malicious ways. “[E]asy simplifications (and not elaborations) of the described
work program could be used to generate a new class of biological weapon.” [178]
If the public perceives a genuine threat that SB can facilitate recreation of
previously-eradicated, deadly, and infectious viruses, then policymakers might feel
pressured into reactionary approaches, such as a moratoria on SB research or a
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ban on the use of federal money to recreate known deadly viruses. The problem
with reactionary regulations is that they are either overbroad or underinclusive,
often featuring poorly crafted definitions or omitting key definitions entirely.
There have been a few hard-law initiatives which demonstrate how they can
be underinclusive. In 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) issued what was considered a watered-down set of guidelines for
screening DNA sequence orders, guidelines which suggested faster and cheaper
processes compared to what private industry had proposed [150]. The 2001
PATRIOT Act criminalized the possession of biological agents, toxins, and delivery
systems, and the 2002 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act required
background checks and registration with the DHHS for anyone in possession of
designated Select Agents [150]. However, DNA sequences can be slightly altered
or divided into multiple segments, making it unclear how federal statutes apply to
attempts to assemble a virus from multiple vendors.
In 2004, the Executive Branch established the National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) under the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
which offered hope that the federal government was taking a greater role in SB
regulation, but that role seems to have resulted in “prudent vigilance” and
“responsible stewardship.” [150,159]
Perhaps the most promising efforts came from synthetic biologists
themselves, working to establish frameworks for self-regulation at conferences
called SB1.0 and SB2.0, held in 2004 and 2006, respectively. The SB2.0
conference discussed several calls to action:
1. Insist That All Commercial Gene Synthesis Houses Adopt Current Best
Practice Screening Procedures;
2. Create and Endorse New Watch-Lists to Improve Industry Screening
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Programs;
3. Create a Confidential Hotline for Biosafety and Biosecurity Issues;
4. Affirm Members’ Ethical Obligation to Investigate and Report Dangerous
Behavior;
5. Create a Community-Wide Clearinghouse for Identifying and Tracking
Potential Biosafety/Biosecurity Issues; and
6. Endorse Biosafety/Biosecurity R&D Priorities [199].
Unfortunately, SB2.0 failed to produce meaningful consensus, and “SB2.0’s
failure to act would trigger a cycle of disappointment and low expectations for
every SB conference thereafter.” [150]
Reactionary regulations can stifle legitimate, beneficial research and make
compliance difficult or erect unintended market barriers. In fact, a strong
reactionary approach could have prevented development of the recent promising
treatment for pediatric brain tumors through deactivated strains of synthesized
poliovirus [204], or the development of safer and affordable insulin [81]. Continued
and open research in SB is one of the most promising avenues for detecting,
understanding, and responding to outbreaks of diseases [62].
Indeed, the European Court of Justice in July 2018 declared genome editing,
which is a technique commonly used in SB, to be essentially the same as
traditional genetic engineering and thus theoretically subject to all of the same
existing GMO regulations. One researcher claimed that “[t]he classification of
genome-edited organisms as falling under the GMO Directive could slam the door
shut on this revolutionary technology. This is a backward step, not progress.” [180]
Another researcher claimed “the decision could set agbiotech in Europe back
another 20 years.” [180]
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Interestingly, the FDA recently approved a new drug for treating smallpox,
despite the World Health Organization having declared the disease eradicated in
1980, because “there have been longstanding concerns that smallpox could be
used as a bioweapon.” [66] Although the FDA did not mention SB in its approval
for the drug, it is safe to assume the world needs such drugs as a direct result of
SB dual-uses, and in turn those drugs could be manufactured with the help of SB
techniques.
Given this background, the rest of this chapter will argue why there is no
appropriate or sufficient national or international form of hard law for regulating
SB. Despite failed prior efforts to establish best practices for SB safety and
security [150], it is more important now than ever to renew the quest for
meaningful forms of oversight. The best approach is a soft-law framework
between government, academia, industry, the DIY community, and the public.
Lastly, we encourage SB researchers to incorporate software engineering
principles as a way to validate and verify the safety and security of their designs.
5.1 Comparisons and Contrasts with other Dual-Use Technologies
Within one year of the discovery of X-rays in 1895, several papers noted their
potential to cause harm to life and the environment [40]. Since 1928, the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has been making
recommendations regarding safe exposure to radiation [106]. The ICRP is a
voluntary international organization with no governmental power, so it can only
encourage nations to adopt regulations to enforce its recommendations.
A similar organization could be of great benefit for addressing SB risks.
However, radiation levels and exposures are relatively easy to measure, as well
as quantifying which levels and exposures are safe to encounter. It is a
completely different and much more difficult task to determine whether SB
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designs are safe or could become dangerous through mutation or evolution.
“While it is feasible to utilize PCR [polymerase chain reaction] to identify a Select
Agent pathogen ‘needle’ from the enormous environmental background
‘haystack,’ there is no technology available today that can reliably alert us when a
novel pathogen, whether natural or engineered, is present in the environmental
background.” [156] Indeed, because “engineered microorganisms are
self-replicating and capable of evolution, they belong in a different risk category
than toxic chemicals or radioactive materials.” [208]
With regard to nuclear weapons, there are many bilateral and multilateral
treaties in place for control and non-proliferation. Similar treaties could be helpful
for control and non-proliferation of SB-based weapons, but the process of crafting,
negotiating, and ratifying a meaningful multilateral treaty would likely take
decades for several reasons. First, definitions are critical in treaties, and “there
remains no universally agreed upon definition of [SB] . . . .” [156] This threshold
definitional question also implies that current treaties banning chemical or
biological weapons are inapplicable to SB-based weapons. “With regard to
chemicals, biochemicals, and toxins, synthetic biology blurs the line between
chemical and biological weapons.” [156]
Second, any multilateral treaty would have to include enforcement and
compliance mechanisms. Enforcement of international treaties is always difficult
and complicated regardless of subject, but compared to SB it is relatively easier to
determine compliance with weapons treaties compared to whatever current
treaties apply to SB. That is because the knowledge, infrastructure, materials, and
overall physical footprint needed to refine uranium into fissile material are
gargantuan compared to what is needed to engineer E. coli cells to produce
known pathogens [218].“The production of most DNA viruses would be
achievable by an individual with relatively common cell culture and virus
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purification skills and access to basic laboratory equipment, making this scenario
feasible with a relatively small organizational footprint (including, for example, a
biosafety cabinet, a cell culture incubator, centrifuge, and commonly available
small equipment).” [156] Furthermore, “activities requiring less equipment may be
able to be pursued by actors with fewer resources and may be conducted in a
clandestine laboratory, making detection or attribution more difficult and therefore
making concern higher” and “it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish a facility being used to develop bioweapons based on synthesized
pathogenic bacteria from a legitimate academic or commercial facility.” [156] This
means SB-based weapons can be produced by not only technologically advanced
nations with abundant resources, but also by small terrorist groups or even an
individual with malicious intent, making enforcement of and compliance with an
international SB treaty either pointless or impossible, depending upon a nation’s
perspective.
The Internet and communications networks by themselves represent a
dual-use technology, because the flow of information can lead to good or
evil—regardless of whether the intent is to share a recipe for chocolate cake or
uranium cake. Internet and network security generally cannot be guaranteed
because it is impossible to prove software is “correct.” [57] Thus, attackers will
continue to have the upper hand because of: zero-day exploits; a generally open
network architecture; and heavy technical debt associated with complicated
interfaces between the Internet’s layers and protocols. For a recent example, the
McAfee Advanced Threat Research team “discovered that access linked to
security and building automation systems of a major international airport could be
bought for only US$10.” [71]
A good (or accidentally bad) programmer can create malware or a virus that
spreads across the Internet [166], just as SB engineers can create a virus that
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spreads among people [165]. Good “cybersecurity,” another term without an
agreed-upon definition, is currently a set of best practices and penetration testing.
Perhaps SB safety and security could benefit from something like the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework, a voluntary set of “standards, guidelines, and best
practices to manage cybersecurity-related risk.” [157] Developing such a
framework for SB would likely take many years, and the task would be beyond the
mission and capabilities of any single U.S. agency. Thus, an SB framework is best
relegated to a voluntary international organization of experts similar to the ICRP.
As a final technological comparison with SB, consider the concern over 3D
printing of guns. The ability to purchase or share plans to print plastic guns at
home is comparable to SB and its DIY movement [89]. Just as the files and
materials needed for 3D designs are easily purchased, shared, or available from
open-source repositories, so too are DNA sequences and the reagents needed to
implement SB designs. Sequences for thousands of toxins and pathogens have
been available online from open-source databases for years, and even the iGEM
BioBrick database includes a sequence for the invasin gene which includes the
ominous statement: “makes E. coli a good bioweapon by allowing bacteria to
enter and live inside human cells.” [100] At this point, any attempts to restrict
access to DNA sequences, equipment, and materials would be similar to
confiscating 3D printers and asking owners to delete all associated data.
Having described some fundamental similarities and distinctions between SB
and earlier dual-use technologies, the next two sections will address what makes
SB unique and so difficult to effectively regulate through hard law.
5.2 Biohackers and DIY: Unknown-Unknowns?
Unlike radiation, the Internet, or 3D printers, SB allows anyone with $2,000 to
manipulate DNA, RNA, and its flow within and without cells. A DIY SB kit is
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currently available for purchase for under $2,000, which “provides all the
equipment, reagents and materials you need to get started in molecular biology
and genetic engineering,” [202] including a centrifuge add-on, shipping not
included. There are even cheaper kits for $150, which are targeted for
middle-school science classrooms and home use which “let you edit a bacterial
gene using instructions made for those without expertise in little more than a
weekend [56]. In 1970, Francis Crick referred to the manipulation of the flow of
DNA and RNA as the central dogma of molecular biology [46]. In other words,
anyone with $2,000 can now manipulate and program life as if a cell were
hardware and DNA were software [201]. (One could argue radiation allows
manipulation of DNA through mutation, but SB allows programmed manipulation
as opposed to stochastic mutation via overexposure to X-rays.)
“Drawing on a computer science imaginary, synthetic biologists compare
themselves with Silicon Valley garage ‘tinkerers’ and ‘hackers’ who sparked the
growth of the microprocessor industry in the 1970s.” [75] If DIY SB kits were
limited to relatively benign projects such as green-glowing plants [128], maybe
they would find a place in history alongside Ant Farms [243], Sea-Monkeys [228],
or the Gilbert U-238 Atomic Energy Laboratory [227]. However, with time and
progress, what experts with plentiful financial backing can achieve today will
become cheaper and easier for the DIY SB community. “Many DIY biology
activities are expressly educational, fun, or tied to local community needs (for
example, testing food samples). Yet while most of these DIY projects are not
sophisticated, the model does make accessible to the general public tools that
can be used to do advanced work,” and although “iGEM projects are carried out
by students, many of them entirely new to bioscience, some projects have been
quite sophisticated.” [156]. To its credit, the iGEM competition heavily stresses
biosafety and biosecurity [269].
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The most famous DIYer from the SB community (or “biohacker”) has been
Aaron Traywick, who notoriously injected himself live online with what he claimed
was his own SB cure for herpes [28]. Traywick died months later from unrelated
circumstances, having drowned in a sensory-deprivation tank [27]. Traywick and
his company Ascendance Biomedical offered a presale campaign for DIY gene
therapy kits, to which the FDA responded: “The sale of these products is against
the law. FDA is concerned about the safety risks involved.” [65] Previously,
Kickstarter had already banned campaigns for DIY starter kits based on legal and
environmental safety concerns with the Glowing Plant Project [104].
Josiah Zayner, a rival colleague of Traywick and founder of The Odin,
currently sells DIY SB kits and supplies and “is working on creating DIY
experiment kits made for use with frogs, so that people can practice science more
safely, and not move straight to experimenting on themselves.” [28] Zayner, who
has also injected himself with what he claimed to be DNA to modify his muscle
genes to give himself bigger muscles [132], has said DIY SB injuries are only a
matter of time: “There have been people who’ve contacted us for the sole
purpose of buying stuff from us to inject. We seriously discourage people from
doing that. Obviously we can’t stop them from doing it, but we discourage people
and try to point them in correct direction so they can seek out knowledge.” [241]
Furthermore, and maybe needless to say, “members of the biohacking community
may not always be familiar with the due biosafety procedures” and “[c]oncerns
include accidental release from one without proper training in laboratory safety
protocols as well as bioterrorism.” [2] In 2018, a 16-year-old high school student
from France claimed to have injected himself with a DNA sequence based upon
an encoding of the Book of Genesis [141].
There is understandable concern, either through intent or negligence, that “a
DIY biologist might use genetic engineering or synthetic biology to create and
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distribute an organism that causes harm, for example by reducing biological
diversity, weakening an existing population of plant or animal life, making people
sick, destroying crops, threatening the food supply, or deterring tourism.” [104]
Zayner has argued, among other reasons, that his DIY kits are safe by analogy
with beer: “Currently, almost all yeast used to create beer has not had its genome
sequenced. This means that despite the yeast being considered safe by the FDA
we have no idea the exact proteins that are inside these yeast[s].” [238]
Zayner has stated he wants to introduce DIY biology to high schools across
the globe [126]. This could be a promising venue for building awareness of safety
and ethical concerns, but there may be trouble brewing. On May 8, 2019, the
California Department of Consumer Affairs notified Zayner that a complaint was
filed against him for practicing medicine without a license [126]. On July 30, 2019,
California passed SB 180, which requires gene therapy kits to come with
prominent notices that they are not designed for “self-administration.” [32]
Whether such notices will prevent self-administration remains to be seen.
Although the DIY SB concerns are valid, for the sake of argument, let us
assume projects such as tinkering with yeast to make fluorescent beer or
lab-made meat [26] are safe, healthy, and an overall benefit to society. The next
section addresses the real, current, and legitimate concerns about rogue nations,
terrorist groups, or simply determined malicious individuals using SB to
manufacture and stockpile known pathogens.
5.3 Malicious Actors: Known-Unknowns?
Biological weaponry dates back to at least ancient times, with the Assyrians
poisoning wells with a fungus in the sixth century BC [125]. In 1346, the Tatar
army catapulted corpses contaminated with the Black Death at Genoese sailors
[135]. With the advent of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, “the
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development of pathogens as weapons became the province of clandestine
nation-state programs and non-state actor terrorism.” [156] In 2016, U.S. director
of national intelligence, James Clapper, asserted that emerging SB threats
“should be listed as dangers alongside nuclear tests in North Korea or clandestine
chemical weapons in Syria.” [160] In 2012, Vladimir Putin said that Russia would
be pursuing new genetic high-tech weapons systems which “will be comparable in
effect to nuclear weapons but will be more ‘acceptable’ in terms of political and
military ideology.” [242] At the 2016 World Economic Forum in Davos, a number of
experts expressed particular concern that non-state actors could “effectively
weaponize and disseminate biological agents.” [210]
5.3.1 Twenty Years’ Warning: The Bioterrorism Threat to Public Health
As far back as 1998, researchers have sounded the alarm over the ever-present
danger of malicious actors deploying biological weapons in terrorist attacks [94].
“Nations and dissident groups exist that have both the motivation and access to
skills to selectively cultivate some of the most dangerous pathogens and to deploy
them as agents in acts of terrorism or war.” [94] Furthermore, biological terrorist
attacks present a variety of technical issues that make them especially difficult to
detect, respond to, and attribute.
If a malicious actor has the ability to “reboot” the smallpox virus, it would have
the potential to cause widespread casualties and panic because most of the
world’s population no longer receives the smallpox vaccination. “In the modem
world . . . smallpox is almost certainly the only pathogen capable of inflicting
large-scale casualties. The idea that terrorists could deliberately infect
themselves to spread the disease was already widely known at the start of the
twentieth century.” [150]
Only a small number of specific groups receive the smallpox vaccine today,
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such as hospital workers, laboratory researchers, and military personnel. In 1998,
it was estimated that only 10-15% of the world’s population retained any smallpox
immunity, and the mortality rate of the unvaccinated who contract the disease is
typically between 25-30% [94]. There is no known specific treatment for smallpox,
and regardless, modern cities would not have nearly enough hospital beds to
handle a major outbreak [94].
Even if there were adequate hospital beds and an effective treatment for
smallpox, health organizations would not know of a potential outbreak, because
those infected show no signs during the ten to twelve-day incubation period [94].
During this time, those infected are contagious [94]. When the first symptoms
arrive, it could still take several days for medical professionals to recognize a
smallpox outbreak, because of the understandable lack of familiarity with the
disease’s symptoms such as high fever and pain. Indeed, during an outbreak in
1972 in Yugoslavia, one patient died before an accurate diagnosis, and was
buried two days before the first case of smallpox was recognized [94]. In all, it
took four weeks after the first patient exhibited symptoms to make an accurate
diagnosis of smallpox. By that time, 150 people were infected [94], resulting in a
total of 175 persons infected with 35 fatalities [94].
Lastly, even if there were plenty of lead time to adequately detect and
respond to an outbreak, it would be extremely difficult for any nation-state to prove
attribution for a biological attack. This is especially true if that nation-state wishes
to provide legal justification for any type of formal retaliation against another
nation-state [156].
There are many viewpoints and uncertainties with respect to how likely,
severe, and possible malicious or negligent SB designs are or could be in the
near future. This could reflect hindsight bias, or the idea that because we have yet
to see a clear example of SB used in an attack, such attacks are either not
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possible or not as easy to accomplish as some have warned.
At the worst extreme, there are doomsday-like arguments that unchecked SB
could lead to an existential threat to humanity or other species and the
environment [24]. At the other extreme, some argue that serious SB weaponry
would require too many resources, raise too many suspicions, be prevented
through market forces, and ultimately entail modifying organisms to the point
where they are “too delicate to survive in the open.” [150]
Somewhere between those two extremes is the 2018 NAS report which
analyzed what threats would likely look like in the near future [156]. The report
concluded that the most probably threats would stem from “re-creating known
pathogenic viruses, making existing bacteria more dangerous, and making
harmful biochemicals via in situ synthesis.” [156] Under those scenarios, the most
dangerous plot would likely entail a rebooting of smallpox, making it more virulent
or communicable, and sending infectious “volunteers” to major transit hubs
concurrently around the world.
5.3.2 Example from the Past: The Aum Shinrikyo Cult
The threat of biological terrorism is a very real and probable threat—likely to be
ever-present yet be hiding in plain sight. Of particular concern are non-state
actors, because they are “the most difficult to detect, deter, or regulate.” [74] An
illustrative warning example comes from a detailed 2011 report on the Aum
Shinrikyo cult, which is most infamous for its sarin gas attack on the Tokyo
subway system in 1995 which killed 13 people and hospitalized approximately
6,000 more [237]. The cult had several facilities, including one which produced
the sarin gas used in the Tokyo attack, which was built for an estimated
$30,000,000 in 1993. This building far exceeded the amount of space and the
estimated $20,000 it would take to build an SB DIY garage today [182]. The cult
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used shell corporations to distract authorities from learning its true function, but
there were several other red flags that should have spurred closer scrutiny of the
cult’s activities at its various facilities.
The report highlights several alarming features about the cult’s success,
despite their relatively modest resources and limited technical knowledge.
Although the cult originally failed at creating and weaponizing biological weapons
such as botulism and anthrax, they had much more success when they switched
to production and distribution of sarin gas, a chemical weapon. One of the
reasons the cult abandoned its pursuit of biological weapons was that in the early
1990s, it was fairly difficult to perform the necessary biological laboratory work to
produce enough materials for an attack. Despite several technical blunders,
in-fighting, and the pursuit of scientifically “bizarre ideas,” the cult’s determination
resulted in the production of enough sarin gas for several attacks, as well as
“research quantities” of: LSD; sodium pentothal; PCP; methamphetamines; GF
nerve agent; VX nerve agent; gunpowder; barbiturates; mescaline; and catalysts
for ammonium and nitric acid [237].
The successful chemical weapons program is concerning for many reasons.
One, there were only a handful of technical experts on hand who knew how to
produce biological and chemical materials. Two, they failed several times and
attracted the attention of various authorities who never fully discovered what the
cult was plotting, even though the facilities had relatively large footprints and
caused nearby residents to become suspicious. Three, the facilities were
relatively affordable to build and avoided government oversight through legal
obfuscation.
The 2011 report concluded: “Terrorists need time; time will be used for trial
and error (tacit knowledge acquisition); trial and error entail risk and, in this case,
provoked disruption; but Aum found paths to WMD, and other terrorists are likely
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to do the same . . . . Groups such as Aum expose us to risks uncomfortably
analogous to playing Russian roulette. Many chambers in the gun prove to be
harmless, but some chambers are loaded.” [237].
As will be seen in the next subsection, a modern-day rogue group would
likely have a much easier time than Aum Shinrikyo if it chooses to pursue a
biological weapons program. First, the number of people skilled enough in SB to
perform the laboratory work needed is growing and the technology of SB itself is
becoming more “de-skilled” and “democratized.” Second, the facilities needed for
that laboratory work require much smaller physical footprints. Third, the facilities
and equipment needed for that laboratory work are much cheaper (and getting
cheaper). Instead of $30,000,000 for a chemical factory, a fully-functioning SB lab
now costs around $20,000 (see Figure 5.1) and can fit in a one-car garage.
Additionally, it would be even easier to cover up through legal misdirection, the
appearances of “legitimate” research, and the use of cryptocurrencies to
purchase materials.
Even back in 1998 one researcher asserted: “biological terrorism is more
likely than ever before and far more threatening than either explosives or
chemicals.” [94] “With the advent of communities like LabX, which sell and auction
used lab equipment suggests that someone may even be able to order a machine
with little oversight and monitoring of who the recipient is in the first place.” [56]
Today, malicious actors have many more methods to acquire biological
agents than the Aum Shinrikyo Cult. Since 2011, the “[t]echnological barriers to
acquiring and using a biological weapon have been significantly eroded.” [210] A
malicious actor could “isolate starting material from an existing environmental or
laboratory source, request material from a peer or repository, purchase pre-made
sequences from a repository or commercial source, purchase custom synthesis,
or use his or her own (or his or her own institution’s) synthesizer.” [74] The
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Figure 5.1: Estimated costs for equipment to establish a DIY SB garage in
2019 [182].
cheapest and arguably least-challenging method would be to order a known toxic
sequence divided into several different chunks from several different synthesis
companies. The individual orders are unlikely to trigger red flags during the
screening process, and they can be reassembled into the original sequence using
the Gibson Assembly method [88,224]. Further obfuscation of malicious intent is
possible by padding unnecessary DNA sequences to the beginning and end of
the target sequences [74]. Even more worrisome, “it will soon be possible to clone
the harmful genes into a harmless bacterial vector to produce the toxin of interest
autonomously. Currently, the synthesized gene can be shipped to the actor, who
may then choose to produce the toxin using commercially available bacteria and
few other reagents and tools.” [56]
5.3.3 Today’s Ongoing Threats
Ten years ago, it was easy to argue that SB threats were years away. For
example, it was argued that high-school and undergraduate students lacked the
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expertise needed to create successful experiments, or at least that the
experiments would be so mistake-prone that it would take “many years” to find
success [150], or that a biohacker “working with limited resources and
less-accurate equipment, would need years to re-engineer and weaponize a
drug-delivery bacterium.” [140] However, since 2004, the iGEM competition has
trained tens of thousands of international high-school and undergraduate
students to conduct SB experiments. Yes, some of the iGEM team projects result
in failures, but there are plenty of examples of successes, and the work is typically
done over the course of one summer [101].
Another example argument is that it would be difficult for a terrorist
organization to purchase pre-made sequences from existing companies because
companies would report suspicious orders to appropriate authorities [150], or that
requesting “multiple suspicious parts would trigger alarms.” [140] This argument
has already been weakened by two specific examples: the purchase of the
smallpox virus [2] and the reassembling of the horsepox virus [165].
There are also many more gene synthesis companies today, internationally,
making it easier to obfuscate intent by purchasing smaller sequences to be
assembled after delivery. For example, BGI Genomics has offices in the U.S., the
U.K., Denmark, Thailand, China, and Australia. It was once argued that the U.S.
would maintain its relative dominance through economies of scale and we would
not need to worry about regulating companies beyond the reach of U.S. law [150].
Furthermore, equipment is now available for $800 which can synthesize
sequences of 1,200bp, meaning malicious actors could bypass private synthesis
altogether [203]. The existence of such affordable equipment defeats another old
argument: that affordable desktop devices would not be an imminent product for
purchase because synthesis companies would try to protect their market share by
investing in large-scale synthesis plants [150].
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Lastly it has been argued that because the world has not seen a nuclear
attack since 1945, this is evidence to suggest terrorists will be unable to
successfully avoid regulatory schemes to implement a successful SB attack [150].
However, there are, and have been, several fundamental differences between
developing nuclear weapons and developing SB weapons, although both
represent “existential risks” to humanity [24]. Nuclear weapons require a large
physical footprint and access to heavily restricted materials and machinery, and
tests are relatively easy to detect because radioactivity is measurable. Or as one
commentator has noted: “We were lucky that making nukes turned out to be
hard.” [25]
On the other hand, experimenting with SB requires little more than a garage
filled with materials and machines which are relatively cheap and easy to acquire,
and they do not emit radiation, let alone malicious intent. Yes, a malicious actor
would need some safety mechanisms to ensure technicians are not exposed to
deadly materials, but terrorists are dedicated and fanatical, and they are not as
likely to be concerned about safety or security as would industry or academia.
In 2018, the National Academies of Science issued a report titled
“Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology.” [156] The report assessed which
national security threats were most worrisome and most likely given the current
state of affairs as well as within the next five years. The report concluded that the
most immediate threat, borrowing a term from computer science, was the
“booting” of existing pathogens. For example, a malicious actor could use the
relatively safe strain of E. coli and use SB techniques to make a cell (the chassis)
produce pathogens for which the DNA sequences are already known. “Rapid
advances in DNA synthesis technology have made it possible to obtain a
pathogen without direct access to the infectious agent itself. Today, any viral
genome can be synthesized based on published sequences, and booting that
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sequence into a replicating form is also feasible for most viruses.” [156] The report
also asserted two other immediate concerns: “making existing bacteria more
dangerous, and making harmful biochemicals via in situ synthesis.” [156]
The report gave several reasons for these immediate concerns. First, SB
makes it easier, cheaper, and faster for a growing number of malicious actors to
manufacture biological or chemical weapons. The equipment and materials
needed are increasingly accessible, and DNA sequences for known pathogens
are online in public databases. Not only could malicious actors boot a pre-existing
virus, they could experiment with its characteristics to make it more
communicable, more harmful, or more difficult to detect [237].
Furthermore, a malicious actor does not need to understand the underlying
biology, chemistry, or genetics to create an effective weapon. “Similar to the way
that modern programming languages do not require software developers to
understand how software routines are executed at the transistor level, biological
design tools are becoming less dependent on base-pair level descriptions of
genetic constructs. In other words, a synthetic biologist may not need to know the
exact sequence of nucleic acids required in order to design a regulatory circuit for
gene expression–simply specifying a particular goal . . . may be sufficient . . . .”
[156]
Second, people who are willing to use SB to create weapons are not likely to
care about being safe or perfecting their designs. “It is also conceivable that
malicious actors would forego some of the rigorous testing that other researchers
would perform, since the standard of success–creating an agent capable of doing
‘enough’ harm–is markedly different from the standards involved in publishing
results in a scientific journal. Malicious actors may also be able and willing to test
in human subjects, unhindered by the moral considerations and ethical
frameworks that guide other research efforts.” [156]
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Third, SB requires relatively little physical space, such as a basement or
garage, making it extremely difficult to monitor or discover malicious activity. “High
potency molecules that can be produced through simple genetic pathways are of
greatest concern, as they could conceivably be developed with modest resources
and organizational footprint.” [156] Implicitly, low-potentcy molecules could
nevertheless form the basis of an effective attack, and SB weaponry would not
necessarily require sophisticated deployment techniques if malicious actors find
willing hosts or if existing pathogens are engineered to be more transmissible.
Finally, attributing SB attacks to their source will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, similar to the attribution problems which plague forensics experts in
cybersecurity. “The increasing physical and virtual separation of design and
manufacturing not only further increases the accessibility of synthetic biology but
also creates potential security concerns where designs cannot necessarily be
explicitly connected to manufacturing locations and vice versa.” [156] Attribution
will also be difficult because by far most of the equipment and materials are used
for beneficial purposes and general applications, so detecting suspicious activity
through individual purchases or any one individual’s online behavior could be
ineffective, especially as SB participation increases around the world.
“[A]ttribution in the age of synthetic biology is likely to be heavily dependent on
computer-based approaches that look for molecular signatures, as well as on
[traditional methods of gathering] intelligence.” [156]
The 2018 report focused on malicious actors using SB to make their own
bioweapons, but that is only one facet of the emerging threats. Malicious actors
could simply acquire bioweapons through other clever means. A terrorist
organization could attempt to compromise employees of DNA synthesis
companies, academics institutions, or national governments and simply have
them produce dangerous materials to be shipped abroad [171]. Consider that in
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2019, two Pakistani men were accused of bribing AT&T employees with over
$1,000,000, including $428,500 to just one employee, to install malware to unlock
iPhones for use outside of the AT&T network [38]. The 2018 report also does not
explore cybersecurity issues associated with DNA synthesis. In fact, researchers
have already demonstrated weaknesses in bioinformatics software, and were
even able to encode malware into a physical DNA strand [163]. It is thus
theoretically possible to mail a physical strand of DNA which could compromise
computers connected to sequencing hardware.
Many companies profiting from the SB boom are also not taking security
seriously enough. “Despite the many potential risks, there is a surprising level of
naiveness among partners in the biotechnology supply chain. This natural trust is
partly associated with the perceived reputation of academic institutions or biotech
companies.” [171] In the U.S., companies providing gene synthesis services are
only encouraged to perform minimal screening of orders against known select
agents and toxins, and are not required to perform background checks on their
clients [1,36]. If a company screens orders against known toxins from an online
database, the database itself represents an attack vector because it could be
compromised by either deleting or modifying entries [163]. It is also possible to
manipulate genetic databases to make individuals appear to be related (perhaps
for inheritance fraud) or to appear unrelated (perhaps to avoid criminal
investigation) [162].
In addition, software and hardware used by SB engineers is not any safer or
more secure compared to those used by other disciplines. Iranian hackers have
already targeted cloud-based DNA sequencing applications [39]. The motivation
could be relatively benign, such as building up a larger botnet for mining
cryptocurrency, or it could be more malicious, such as exfiltrating the DNA
sequences of specifically targeted individuals for sale on the dark web [39].
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A security researcher has also shown that a commonly used “best practice”
software package called the Burrows-Wheeler Aligner (BWA) implements unsafe
function calls which can result in buffer overflows, allowing an attacker to execute
arbitrary code on any genomics machine that runs the software [99]. The BWA
software relies on a human genome database stored centrally on one server
hosted by the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) and is
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, which could allow an attacker to
manipulate DNA sequencing results, possibly influencing medical diagnoses or
forensics analyses [99]. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the NCBI BLAST tool,
which is commonly used to screen sequences against known toxic proteins, is
now available through cloud computing services.
Figure 5.2: The NCBI landing page showing BLAST searches are available
through cloud computing.
If DNA synthesis computers are connected to an Internet-facing network, the
ability to run arbitrary code implies that an attacker could simply take control of
the synthesis machine and co-opt it to issue any sequence, bypassing the
screening process entirely. An attacker could also corrupt the screening
databases, whether stored locally or accessed via cloud services, and modify
toxin entries to be non-toxic. The attacker could then safely order a dangerous
sequence under the assumption it would no longer raise any red flags. On top of it
all, sensitive information about BioWatch pathogen sensors, which were installed
in 30 U.S. cities as part of the response to the anthrax attacks of 2001, was stored
for over a decade on an insecure website [14].
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The technical debt surrounding our new “bioeconomy,” which accounts for as
much as $4 trillion or roughly 25% of the U.S. GDP annually, has led to some
researchers calling for a new hybrid disciplinary called “cyberbiosecurity.” [155]
Bioinformatics software and systems suffer from the same vulnerabilities as other
“Big Data” processes, and the four steps of the cyber-physical supply chain from
1) sequencing, 2) alignment, 3) screening, and 4) synthesis all face the same
vulnerabilities as any other manufacturing industry that sells dual-use
technologies [155]. Consider that Big Data, by itself, is a dual-use technology
because on one hand it can be used to screen sequences for pathogenic
qualities, while on the other it could be used to discover sequences never seen
before in nature (“xenonucleic”) which could be more pathogenic than those
already known and documented [155]. In addition, the cyberbiosecurity supply
chain should be expanded to include aspects of agricultural production and
distribution systems, because malicious SB designs could surreptitiously reduce
crop yields or destroy crops altogether [74,155]. Lastly, malicious actors can
replace, and thus avoid detection at, any step of the biosecurity supply chain for
which they possess adequate technical skill and equipment [56,74].
All of these threats might seem daunting and insurmountable. The next
section offers some hope and suggestions for how to address the emerging
threats to ensure SB continues to advance and deliver its full beneficial potential.
5.4 The Inadequacies of International and Domestic Law
5.4.1 The Biological Weapons Convention
Traditional regulatory measures such as treaties, statutes, and regulations are
difficult to properly tailor to rapidly advancing technology, and the amount of time
it takes to codify them almost ensures they will be outdated upon implementation.
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“Unnecessary and unreasonable rules will undermine credibility and respect for
the law. Over-regulation can also overburden . . . with a jungle of rules that defeat
their own purpose because they are impossible to administer effectively.” [72]
Indeed, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), perhaps famous for its
failures [138], itself explicitly recognizes the dangers of over-regulation, because it
requires parties to “facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information” so biological agents and toxins can be used for peaceful purposes
[210].
However, the BWC lacks universal membership, and it has been criticized for
not being sufficiently restrictive. One, “it does not include measures to ensure
compliance by States Parties.” [109] Two, it is extremely difficult to determine
objectively whether a member is intentionally engaging in malicious activity or
legitimate research [109,211]. Third, it is becoming easy to quickly create
pathogenic materials and equally easy to eliminate the evidence, making
inspections increasingly ineffective [109] and making allegations easier to deny
[211]. Traditional signatures of an illegitimate biological weapons program no
longer apply to current SB advances, and it is no longer necessary to stockpile
large quantities of pathogenic materials or conduct a weapons program in
traditional settings, making it difficult to define which facilities are capable of
producing biological weaponry (and thus subject to inspection) [211]. Fourth, the
BWC has traditionally concerned itself with larger-scale threats, but it seems that
smaller-scale attacks are more likely given the nature of global conflict today, and
biological weapons are easier to implement and harder to detect or attribute [211].
Fifth, the BWC lacks universal membership and needs stronger export controls
[211]. Sixth, the BWC does not apply to non-state actors, or even individuals, who
“have repeatedly demonstrated the intent to acquire and use biological weapons,
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and their lack of success to date is no guarantee that they might not eventually
succeed.” [211]. Perhaps the strongest critique, as expressed by the United
States, is that no internationally accepted procedure exists to verify compliance
with the BWC’s prohibitions [211].
5.4.2 U.S. Domestic Law
As for domestic law in the U.S., SB has so far been regulated by the so-called
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, which the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy created in 1986. This framework
encourages several federal agencies to coordinate with each other and determine
which agency has proper authority to regulate specific SB technologies. “The new
generation of biotechnologies already does and increasingly will create products
that do not fall within the statutory triggers that the Coordinated Framework
directed FDA, USDA, and EPA to use to justify regulation.” [172] Another criticism
of the current framework is that it focuses too much on the products and uses of
SB, but not necessarily the processes or the various access vulnerabilities all
along the supply chain [74]. The current framework also focuses on protecting
intellectual property and personal medical information, as opposed to sharing
information which could be mined for new products and applications [235].
It can be extremely difficult and frustrating for industry leaders to bring new
beneficial SB products to market because it is unclear which agency should be
petitioned first, which agency will give final authority, and how long the whole
approval process will take. The technology is advancing more rapidly than any
single agency can adequately handle [74]. Given the potentially wide set of
applications, a company could create a new SB crop which: is nutritious food;
produces its own pesticide; is a cure for acne; emits red fluorescence if
over-watered; and presents a low risk of causing rashes for infants and the
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elderly. A regulatory compliance attorney is likely to be confused about where to
start the approval process, or whether the crop is exempt from agency oversight.
For example, the USDA proposed a new rule for bioengineered food labeling
to be codified at 7 C.F.R. part 66, with staggered effective dates starting January
1, 2020 [213]. According to the USDA, the new rule “defines bioengineered foods
as those that contain detectable genetic material that has been modified through
certain lab techniques and cannot be created through conventional breeding or
found in nature.” [212] This compact description includes several definitional
phrases that will likely require further refinement and interpretation, such as:
“detectable genetic material,” “certain lab techniques,” and “conventional
breeding.”
There is some guidance for DNA synthesis companies, however, even though
the overall supply chain exists in a “minimally regulated environment.” [74].
Companies are encouraged by the International Gene Synthesis Consortium
(IGSC) Harmonized Screening Protocol to perform background checks on their
clients and screen purchased sequences against lists of known pathogens.
However, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) does not have
any enforcement authority, and there are some exceptions from regulatory
oversight from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) depending upon which
organisms are used in SB designs [74]. In 2005, eight oligonucleotide synthesis
companies admitted they did not scan orders regularly, and one company
admitted it did not scan longer sequences regularly [4]. At the very least,
screening of orders and clients should be mandatory.
However, even these voluntary measures, if strictly followed, are inadequate
by themselves. “For example, current guidance did not prohibit a DNA provider
from fulfilling an order for the genome of the extinct virus horsepox.” [156] In 2006,
a journalist from The Guardian ordered fragments of the smallpox gene delivered
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to his residential address.” [2] Screening can be avoided altogether today,
because relatively short sequences can be synthesized in a basic home lab [2].
“An over-reliance on the Select Agent list is a systemic weakness affecting many
aspects of the United States’ current biodefense mitigation capability. Another
weakness is that companies do not screen DNA sequences of less than 200 base
pairs (known as oligonucleotides, or “oligos”). “Screening short sequences
produces large numbers of false alarms and remains challenging even today.”
[150] This has raised concerns that a determined malicious actor could obtain
multiple short sequences from commercial vendors and assemble them to create
full-length pathogen DNA.” [56,156]. For example, the main toxin from black
widow spiders is 4,201bp [244], meaning it is theoretically possible to divide the
sequence into 22 separate orders and reassemble them without raising red flags.
Some have suggested the need for a “federated” approach among the
synthesis companies to coordinate the screening process because current
practices “cannot trigger concern when orders are divided up among synthesis
companies to obfuscate intention.” [74]. With the “absence of oligonucleotide
order screening amongst the industry, there still exist penetrable gaps through the
ability to connect them together to form larger genes or even entire genomes.” [56]
The list-based screening is also fundamentally insufficient because it only
screens against known-knowns, or those DNA sequences which we know have
pathogenic qualities, similar to how anti-virus software typically relies on
screening against a known blacklist of malicious software [156]. A similar problem
exists for the IGSC Harmonized Screening Protocol which asks members to
screen clients against a list of individuals and companies known to have ties to
drug trafficking or terrorism [74]. As noted above, it is possible to break up longer
sequences into shorter sequences and assemble them after delivery in order to
avoid raising red flags. A more cinematic scenario would be for a rogue nation or
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terrorist group to spend the time and money to send an operative to graduate
school to learn microbiology and SB, where all the tools are already available to
boot a pathogen under the guise of legitimate research. This highlights the
importance of background checks at both the academic and industry levels, and
even suggests the need for DIY groups to perform due diligence on their
members, in addition to highlighting the need for adequate physical security for
the DNA synthesis equipment itself [74].
Within the DIY community, which is generally not subject to federal regulation,
the only restraints on malicious uses seem to be self-regulation and an unwritten
biohacker code of ethics [2]. Although in 2011, DIY biologists set forth two
separate drafts of high-level codes of ethics for Europe and North America [54].
This has led some to suggest DIYers could play an important role as the “glue”
with knowledge to share between stakeholders [2]. However, “[c]odes of conduct
are only effective when researchers are able to recognize problematic
experiments.” [150]
One other hard-law suggestion would be to improve whistleblower statutes to
encourage researchers, employees, and members of DIY groups to expose
dangerous or suspicious activity. While promising on its face, it is very difficult to
determine whether a colleague is conducting dangerous experiments, either
negligently or intentionally, and a malicious actor is likely to be more careful to
obfuscate their intent [150].
5.5 Hard-law Risks and Soft-law Proposals
Despite these emerging concerns about regulatory oversight for SB, as of 2018,
“there is a dearth of proactive rather than reactive initiatives being undertaken to
evolve governance structures.” [206] That is not to suggest the international SB
community has somehow ignored its responsibilities or to suggest there have
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been no significant attempts to address SB security concerns. From roughly 2001
to 2010, there were several proactive, well-coordinated, and international
attempts to regulate SB security through soft-law and hard-law approaches [150].
In fact, researchers have raised concerns over bio-engineered epidemics since
the 1970s [150]. The push for security was stoked by some late 1990s fictional
novels featuring engineered biological attacks, the anthrax attacks against the
U.S. in late 2001, and an Australian research team which altered some pox
viruses to defeat vaccines [150]. Unfortunately, this roughly ten-year effort failed
to result in any meaningful security oversight [150].
“The absence of mandatory oversight mechanisms for privately funded
individuals may in part account for why they have increasingly come to be seen as
a group of concern by a scientific community that has for forty years been granted
the authority to self-govern.” [75] Although stronger regulation seems necessary, if
only to help prevent an accidentally disastrous SB release, hard laws such as
statutes and regulations could easily stifle the research necessary to prevent,
detect, and respond to SB accidents or weapons. “[I]t can be difficult to identify a
priori which research findings entail dual-use risks . . . scientific freedom and
access to information are crucial to technological innovation and . . . restricting
publication would slow the development of medical countermeasures against
biological threats.” [84] “Metabolic engineering could potentially be used to
produce toxins, narcotics, or other products relevant to biodefense. For example,
yeast has already been engineered to produce opioids in minute quantities.” [156]
Researchers also recently used yeast to unnaturally achieve complete
biosynthesis of cannabinoids [143].
Existing U.S. agencies have struggled to neatly square their statutory power
with the unique challenges of SB: 1) organisms are living and can mutate and
evolve; 2) traditional safety testing techniques could be inappropriate for
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organisms which have never been seen in nature; and 3) traditional focus on
products, not processes, could be inappropriate when it is SB-engineered
organisms themselves which are producing the potentially risky end-product
chemicals [148].
The U.S. Coordinated Framework is inadequate to handle the rapidly
advancing, multidisciplinary applications of SB [2]. One suggestion would be to
scrap the framework entirely and ask specific agencies to take lead roles, but that
would not eliminate the problem of agencies fighting with each other over their
regulatory powers (or lack thereof). Another suggestion has been to require
engineers and laboratories to acquire some type of licensing in order to purchase
equipment and materials for SB research [115]. This approach seems too late,
similar to how it would be nearly impossible to recall all 3D printers and their
materials from the stream of commerce. Like 3D printers, SB equipment and
reagents have been for sale to the public for years. Nevertheless, it might be
possible to identify key materials and activities that trigger suspicion of malicious
intent just as regulators have done with the nuclear supply chain [74].
However, smaller companies typically do not view themselves as targets for
malicious actors, and the SB industry is marked by fierce competition and the
associated pressure to maintain profitability, meaning it will be difficult to foster
cooperation. In addition, the “current financial environment in the U.S. has also
incentivized research institutions and healthcare facilities to contract genetic
sequencing services to Chinese or Chinese-affiliated firms,” but those Chinese
firms are not subject to the same regulatory oversight with respect to “disease
research, health diagnostics, genealogy studies, and personal health information.”
[235]. “Theoretically, the combination of genetic data through research
collaborations, legitimate business agreements, and hacked information being
exfiltrated to China would be the largest, most diverse dataset ever compiled.”
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[235] Moreover, the Chinese government itself may be funding research into
gene-edited embryos, an activity which the broader international community views
as unethical [175], despite evidence that fertility clinics around the world
expressed have interest in offering gene-editing services to their customers. [15]
Interestingly, He Jianuki claimed he had followed all of the embryo-editing
guidelines from the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine
during the “CRISPR Babies” project [16]. This has led to the International
Commission on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing to meet and
generate “a more detailed, less ambiguous report on embryo editing.” [16] Even if
the new guidelines are clearer, unethical experiments will likely continue. For
example, China was the location chosen for the creation of human-monkey
chimeras “to avoid legal issues.” [48]
Perhaps the most successful soft-law initiative so far has been the IGSC,
formed in 2009 as a voluntary industry group dedicated to developing best
practices for screening orders and customers. Most of the larger synthesis
companies are members of the IGSC which shares alerts when a member
receives a suspicious order. A weakness in this process is that a member might
not deem an order to be suspicious enough or simply might fail to notify
government authorities who could further investigate the order to determine
whether it is part of a larger malicious scheme [74]. All companies, regardless of
size, have internal pressure to avoid public relations nightmares. That is, which
SB synthesis company would gladly make a few extra dollars knowing its products
would be used in a terror attack? Even with strong external pressures such as
export controls and mandatory disclosures of clients’ intended uses of SB
technology, it is relatively easy to obfuscate malicious intent through shell
corporations, superficially legitimate descriptions, and the use of multiple brokers
to acquire various components [74]. Regardless, biological data is not currently
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considered “security-related” and not subject to export controls [235].
Also, external pressures would require complete international cooperation to
effectively enforce. If one nation allows the sale of SB DIY materials and
equipment to any individual, an SB licensing scheme would merely burden those
pursuing legitimate research. Or, some nations could be secretly funding dubious
research such as engineering human embryos to produce more intelligent human
beings [176]. Such research might be considered unethical by international
experts but does not otherwise constitute a clear violation of international law.
While hard-law solutions can be extremely difficult to tailor, monitor, and
enforce, soft-law solutions lack compulsory enforcement mechanisms and are
often not restrictive enough. Moreover, soft-law approaches lack traditional
procedural processes which attempt to promote transparency and ensure all
stakeholders have a chance to participate [148]. There are also subtle side effects
of soft-law regimes, such lack of consumer confidence in the government’s ability
to adequately regulate companies, and the lack of stability in what guidelines
companies must or should follow [148]. Despite the pros and cons of each
approach, a soft-law solution is preferable due to its flexibility, transnational
applicability, and potential for iteration to better address frequent and rapid
progress.
What the world needs now is a voluntary, non-profit international consortium
compromised of all stakeholders to share information and concerns. A concerned
citizen should be able to have a productive discussion about SB concerns with a
DIYer, an academic researcher, a private innovator, and a government official.
The consortium would be responsible for developing and maintaining best
practices and codes of ethics, and crafting responses to threats it becomes aware
of. There are no substitutes for open communication and knowledge with a
technology accessible to anyone with a desk and $2,000. We also need a less
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adversarial and more cooperative approach for governance between private
industry and regulators. The consortium could be guided by the “TAPIC”
framework, which was originally proposed to overcome structural challenges to
improve public health systems [207].
Other soft-law proposals include “voluntary programs, consensus standards,
partnership programs, codes of conducts, principles, and certification programs”
with “substantive expectations or requirements.” [148] These more flexible
approaches are suitable for a rapidly advancing science, because they can be
adopted and amended more rapidly through iteration cycles, can provide a more
adaptive oversight system, can more easily cross national boundaries, and are
based on a collaborative, rather than adversarial, model [148].
Hard laws are difficult to pass and enact, because “the presence of multiple
and decentralized veto-holders in the policy generation, implementation, and
reform process makes the development and reform of hard law a complex and
politically intensive effort that can take years to decades to achieve.” [207] Or
more simply stated, “major statutory or regulatory change is politically difficult,
time-consuming, and expensive.” [148] Hard laws could have a similar side-effect
as the BWC: pushing SB weapon development into the basements and bunkers
of rogue nations and terrorists. Without robust and unhindered counter-research,
we can only depend upon our public health systems to “recognize outbreaks of
novel pathogens, whether natural or engineered.” [156] However, “the majority of
public health experts agree that America is woefully unprepared for any sort of
mass-scale bioterrorism event.” [115] We need meaningful cooperation and
greater openness.
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5.6 Addressing Threats Through Another Dual-Use Technology: Computer
Science
Gaps in traditional and soft-law regulatory approaches could be addressed
through improving the technology of SB itself, and there are several aspects of
applying computer science techniques to SB that could help alleviate some of the
concerns regarding dual-uses. There are many parallels between programming
life and programming computers, and international efforts to keep SB safe and
secure should include representatives from computer science, computer
engineering, and cybersecurity.
The rapid advances in SB are unsurprisingly linked to rapid advances in
high-speed computing, which itself is also a dual-use technology. The algorithms
used in bioinformatics and DNA sequencing are both processor-intensive and
memory-intensive, but researchers are developing ways to improve efficiency in
terms of both time and physical resources [82]. If computer science has enabled
malicious actors to more easily and cheaply create pathogenic cells through SB,
then it also should enable researchers to more easily and cheaply detect, predict,
attribute, and respond to emerging threats.
Computational theory, artificial intelligence, and systems engineering are
increasingly intertwined with SB, and the software tools used to make beneficial
designs have the same potential to assist making malicious designs. “The role of
computational approaches for prevention, detection, control, and attribution will
become more important with the increasing reliance of synthetic biology on
computational design and computational infrastructure.” [156] It is important to
note that any software tools developed for beneficial purposes are themselves
vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially if running on machines accessible
through an Internet connection, meaning a malicious actor could use malware to
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exfiltrate valuable information from biosynthesis companies or otherwise
manipulate systems to achieve control over the design, implementation, and test
cycles of a target facility [155,163,171].
Synthetic biology can be viewed as programming life, with DNA as code, cells
as processing units, and plasmids as functions or methods. As early as 2003,
researchers developed the Synthetic Biology Markup Language (SBML) to
facilitate international cooperation for modeling metabolic pathways and
cell-to-cell signaling [98]. In 2014, the first version of the SBOL was introduced
which helped establish a standard for describing composite structures and their
interactions with an emphasis on visualization [80]. The SBOL standard
integrates with common programming languages such as C++, Java, JavaScript,
and Python. There is also a 2018 project called Cameo, which is a Python library
for enabling computer-aided design for optimizing metabolic pathways in cellular
“factories.” [34]
Other examples of applying computer science to SB include: GENOCad, a
context-free grammar for developing composite parts from BioBricks [164];
automated cellular circuit design based on three inputs [164]; machine learning to
help determine which BioBricks are most likely to be of use to implement specific
designs [232]; DNA “barcodes” or “watermarks” for attribution and provenance,
along with erecting “genetic firewalls” to prevent unwanted interactions between
natural and synthesized organisms [217]; systems control to improve biosafety
and robustness in the face of uncertainties related to mutation and unanticipated
contexts [49]; and the application of software-engineering principles used to
certify and verify safety-critical systems [44,70], because traditional software
engineering principles are a natural complement for synthetic biology as
programming life [215]. Good coding practices such as abstraction, composition,
low coupling, and high cohesion could be applied to BioBricks, allowing engineers
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to reason about safety and security earlier in the design process [44,70].
Drawing parallels between computer science and SB helps illustrate the need
for interdisciplinary collaboration, and possibly the need for a common set of
definitions to reason about problems and solutions. This means experts from
computer science and computer engineering should also be part of any
collaborative efforts to promulgate best practices for SB safety and security.
For example, if there is renewed interest in collaborative self-governance
through efforts like SB2.0, SB3.0 should include experts from software
engineering and cybersecurity to offer different perspectives on what attackers
could accomplish on current hardware or software systems, especially if those
systems have a publicly-facing network connection. The NSABB could also
benefit from considering new members who have in-depth knowledge of hardware
and software systems used in the design-build-test cycle.
Practical advice could be simple, such as suggesting that sensitive
equipment should be air-gapped from the Internet, or establishing chains of
custody for sensitive materials using encryption schemes and “smart” cabinets.
From a more theoretical perspective, software engineering principles such as
deep learning might help predict whether a novel DNA sequence has the potential
to be pathogenic [8].
Other crossover research could be inspired by fault-detection techniques in
highly configurable systems, or software certification in safety-critical systems.
For example, Mozilla Firefox has over 22,000 user-configurable options [198], a
number far larger than the estimated number of atoms in the universe (1080) [194],
representing a configuration space that could never be exhaustively tested. A
DNA plasmid can often be 5,000bp, or 45,000 different configurations, a number
even larger than 22,000. Software testing principles for highly configurable systems
such as combinatorial interaction testing [86] could help manage the vast
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configuration space which DNA represents, with the potential to find biological
“faults.”
If SB organisms are considered safety-critical systems which can cause harm
to life or the environment, then it might be possible to apply validation and
verification techniques similar to those used in avionics and the automotive
industry. Just as car manufacturers must prove run-time guarantees that there is
enough processing power and acceptably low latencies to effectively activate an
anti-lock braking system [167], a synthetic biologist could be required to make
specific biological run-time guarantees, such as that the engineered organisms
will die within 30 minutes after escaping containment [70].
Advances in computer science could also result in “effective
counter-measures against actual use of biological weapons,” something Japan
believes could be a key way to enforce the BWC [109]. Arguably, the primary goal
of collaborative research should be to rapidly develop techniques to detect the
intentional release of pathogens [158], something which is currently difficult and
could take a week or longer [94].
Artificial intelligence could help detect suspicious purchasing patterns, similar
to how credit card companies use software to detect fraud. A key innovation
would be to scan purchase orders place across multiple biosynthesis companies
to determine whether those individual orders could be assembled into a
pathogenic construct. To be sure, this is a lofty goal. First, it would likely require
intelligent, connected labs [56] and a third-party database for tracking customers
and purchases. Second, collaboration is nevertheless unlikely among companies
in a highly competitive market where false-positives could lead to the loss of
legitimate clients [74]. Furthermore, there will always be tension between a
client’s desire for confidentiality and a regulator’s desire to access information,
especially if the client wishes to protect DNA sequences as trade secrets [74].
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Despite these pragmatic concerns, the U.S. has suggested the need for an
interactive database for sharing information and facilitating requests for
assistance [211]. All of these research directions hold great promise for improving
safety and security of synthetic biology, with the underlying insight that complex
problems have complex solutions.
5.7 Conclusion
Although this chapter serves as a warning about current SB risks, it hopefully
makes clear that reactionary regulations would stifle beneficial research. Of
particular concern would be hard law preventing the type of research needed to
counter malicious uses of SB. Malicious actors are unlikely to concern themselves
with legal, ethical, moral, safety, or security concerns. A much better approach
would be an international non-profit organization based on soft-law principles of
openness and cooperation. Computer Science principles will continue to play a
vital role in the development and effectiveness of SB applications.
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Chapter 6
Extending Existing Methods for Toxin Prediction
With the advances in DNA next-generation sequencing (NGS) and high-speed
computing, it has become possible to analyze vast amounts of genomic data in
theoretically infinite ways. Recent research has focused on applying supervised
machine learning techniques such as natural language processing (NLP) or
support vector machines (SVMs) to ascertain meaning from DNA
sequences [77,107]. A typical goal is to predict protein characteristics or
functionalities based on DNA sequences which have known properties, such as
whether a sequence represents a potentially cancerous mutation or whether it is a
toxin or otherwise pathogenic.
However, it is difficult to find meaning in DNA sequences without context
because they are not necessarily tokenizable like natural languages. It is also
difficult to know the function or characteristics of novel proteins if there are no
analogs available for referencing against annotated protein databases.
Other recent research has placed emphasis on the importance of microRNA
strands (roughly 22bp) and their effect on gene expression and mutation [13,147].
Researchers have tried to determine which motifs, or patterns, appear more or
less frequently in beneficial or harmful microRNA strands.
This chapter, inspired by revisiting an early text-compression algorithm [78],
presents a way to find and visualize motifs which are common (or uncommon) in
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known toxin and non-toxin sequences, with the aim of providing in silico guidance
for determining characteristics and functionality of novel synthesized proteins.
The result is an extension of existing tools to provide more granularity of
information and new visualizations for training data sets.
6.1 Motivation
It is possible to synthesize arbitrary DNA sequences by ordering them from an
increasing number of DNA synthesis companies with names like Genscript [248],
Gene Universal [247], and Twist Bioscience [281]. It is not necessary to outsource
shorter sequences, because they can be synthesized by personal lab equipment
in a garage [2]. A primary concern over the ease and affordability of DIY SB is
whether malicious actors could order supplies of known toxins, the sequences of
which are available in annotated, open-source databases such as UniProt [7].
There are no formal legal requirements for DNA synthesis companies to screen
their orders for toxicity or pathogenicity, nor for them to perform background
checks on their clients [1]. They are encouraged to perform background checks
on clients and screen requested sequences against lists of known toxins and
pathogens, but these voluntary measures are inadequate by themselves, even if
strictly followed. Over-reliance on screening against known toxins leads to a false
sense of security [74], similar to how anti-virus signature lists do not protect
against zero-day exploits.
Figure 6.1 shows the main online interface for BLAST [245], a tool which
allows anyone to upload DNA sequences to compare their similarities with a large
database of annotated sequences gathered from nature. BLAST is maintained by
the National Center for Biotechnology Information and is the most commonly used
for screening sequences. There are several different string-distance and
alignment algorithms from which to choose, as well as 27 databases from which
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to search against. A user can search against all non-redundant entries, or any
subset of 27 databases. Although the algorithms are deterministic, results can
vary depending upon which databases are used. Ideally, DNA synthesis
companies will use BLAST to screen every order to confirm customers have not
requested a known toxin or pathogen.
Figure 6.1: The online NCBI BLAST tool for comparing a sequences
against known proteins [245].
However, DNA sequences of less than 200bp, called “oligonucleotides” or
“oligos,” are not screened [156]. “This has raised concerns that a determined
malicious actor could potentially obtain multiple short sequences from commercial
vendors and assemble them to create full-length pathogen DNA.” [156]
Furthermore, better screening techniques could benefit the growing DIY
community, as the equipment becomes cheaper and more accessible for
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individuals to synthesize their own oligonucleotides [2].
Another challenge is that list-based screening is fundamentally insufficient
because it only screens against toxins which researchers have confirmed have
pathogenic qualities [156]. Moreover, list-based screening can produce
false-positives by flagging harmless proteins as dangerous for being homologous
to known toxins [161]. Because SB technology allows any sequence to be
synthesized, even those which have never been seen before in nature, it is critical
to be able to reason about novel sequences to determine whether they might be
harmful before they are released into the environment [161].
There has been much research devoted to applying NLP techniques to DNA
sequences to predict protein structure, function, and pathogenicity [107,236,239].
Although promising, “one of the apparent differences between biological
sequences and many natural languages is that biological sequences (DNA, RNA,
and proteins) often do not contain clear segmentation boundaries, unlike the
existence of tokenizable words in many natural languages.” [8]
Despite the challenges, there seems to be a growing consensus that the
frequency of DNA motifs is, among others, a valuable data point for determining
protein characteristics. The intuition for this chapter is that analyzing frequencies
of longer motifs will provide additional data points and greater granularity of input
for protein classifiers. If microRNA strands of roughly 22bp are important for
determining protein characteristics, then tools should be able to provide
information about motifs of at least that length, but state-of-the-art tools do not.
To that end, this chapter presents an easily implementable algorithmic
approach to gather basic statistics about DNA sequences generally, but
implemented with two main groups: 1) a set of known toxins; and 2) a set of
known non-toxins. The core idea is byte-pair counting for frequencies of character
strings. The data is then visualized in a variety of ways which could be used to
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establish training sets for other machine learning prediction tools.
6.2 Related Work
Over the last 20 years, there has been increasing emphasis on the importance of
microRNA strands in facilitating gene expression and DNA translation [13,147].
MicroRNA strands are roughly 22bp in length, representing 422 or roughly
17.5 trillion possible sequences of the four possible nucleotides. This is a much
smaller combinatorial space to reason about compared to plasmid sequences,
which are often 5,000bp (roughly 1.995× 103,010 possible sequences) or greater.
Consider the size of the human genome, which is 3,088,286,401bp (roughly
6.373× 10185,933,683 possible sequences).
Other recent research has suggested low-frequency gene mutations are key
for predicting or detecting specific types of cancer [144]. The importance of
microRNA strands and low-frequency gene mutations with respect to larger
biological systems are similar to the importance of patterns, anti-patterns, and
fault localization in software testing of highly configurable systems. Mozilla
Firefox, for example, has well over 22,000 possible configurations available for users
[198]. The intuition is that harmful biological DNA “code” such as toxins or
cancers could be analogous to configuration and interaction faults in software.
The most influential related work applies supervised machine learning to
known toxin and non-toxin DNA sequences, with the goal of being able to predict
a priori whether any given sequence is pathogenic. These techniques rely on
classification of data points using SVMs and NLP to reason about protein
sequences with known characteristics for training sets. The most comprehensive
open-source database of protein sequences is UniProt, which is actively
maintained [113].
The challenge of applying NLP to DNA sequences is that they are not easily
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tokenizable and do not have an apparent set of parsable grammar rules for
determining syntax or meaning. One common way to reason about a large DNA
sequence is to decompose it into shorter sequences, variously described as
“motifs,” “n-grams,” or “k-mers” (where “n” and “k” are the base-pair lengths of the
subsequences).
Protein sequences from online databases are most-commonly stored in
FASTA files which are simply text files with a header describing what is known
about the sequence. The sequences are usually encoded in the 20-letter peptide
alphabet, where each letter represents an amino acid triplet of base pairs. An
example FASTA file for a spider toxin is shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: An example FASTA file for a spider toxin encoded in the
20-letter peptide alphabet.
One method of predicting protein characteristics is to split the full sequences
into peptide 3-grams (which would be translated into motifs of nucleotide
9-grams), then using frequencies of those motifs to train an NLP system based on
the known characteristics of those proteins [9]. Another approach is to combine
several machine-learning classifiers and aggregate their predictions (e.g., “1” is
toxic and “0” is nontoxic). Assuming each classifier deserves equal weight, one
research group combined nine classifiers for a toxin prediction summation score
ranging from 0-9 [77].
Other approaches leverage speech-processing techniques by analyzing
n-grams of various lengths along with “skip-grams” which ignore certain
substrings [107]. The purpose of ignoring skip-grams is to reduce the
configuration space to a more manageable size, with an implicit assumption that
94
some substrings are not relevant for protein classification.
Even early text-compression algorithms have inspired new ways to find
patterns as input for training data. Altering the original byte-pair compression
algorithm, which was introduced in 1994 [78], led to the concept of
“nucleotide-pair encoding” to build data sets for training on phenotype prediction,
biomarker detection, and taxonomic analysis [10]. Somewhat similar follow-on
work was done for “motif mining” using “peptide-pair encoding” which generates a
set of the most-common amino acid pairs from the 20-letter alphabet (202, or 400
possible 2-gram sequences), which are then analyzed with a skip-gram neural
network [8].
Pse-in-One 2.01 is an online toolset which analyzes DNA or peptide
sequences to provide statistics and some visualizations which could be used to
train support vector machines (SVMs) for various types of predictions [139].
However, their tools appear to only analyze up to 3-mers for peptides (203) and
6-mers for nucleotides (46) [279]. Figure 6.3a shows Pse-in-One’s visualizion of
peptide 3-mers of a spider toxin, and Figure 6.3b shows the visualization of
nucleotide 6-mers for that same toxin.
Note that neither visualizations provide meaningful labels for which motifs
they represent. It would be more useful for the labels to include the actual
characters of the motifs for each row and column, such as “0:AAA” and “63:TTT.”
Figure 6.3a is especially confusing because it uses a 90x90 matrix for the 8,000
possible peptide 3-mers, resulting in 8,100 data points. That means there are 100
superfluous points, and it is unclear how the rows and columns translate to the
actual peptide motifs. Pse-in-One only offers this one type of visualization,
sometimes called a two-dimensional heat map.
This work shows it is possible to visualize the motifs in a multitude of other,
1The name Pse-in-One was developed from “PseDAC-General,” an abbreviation for “pseudo
deoxyribonucleic acid compositions for DNA sequences.”
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(a) Visualization for a spider toxin using
a 3-mer of peptides.
(b) Visualization for a spider toxin using
a 6-mer of nucleotides.
Figure 6.3: Visualizations for peptides and nucleotides from
Pse-in-One [279].
more useful ways, and also to analyze motifs containing a greater number of
characters. Analysis can be extended to 6-mers and 8-mers for peptides, and up
to 16 nucleotides before running into memory constraints. There are 208
(25, 600, 000, 000) possible 8-mers for peptides, and 416 (4, 294, 967, 296) possible
16-mers for nucleotides.
Others have suggested that over-reliance on sequence similarity for protein
classification can be insufficient and misleading for a wide variety of proteins, and
additional layers of information, such as protein structure, can improve accuracy
[161]. There is growing agreement that a multifaceted approach is needed for
protein classification [55]. One recent study looked at several factors such as
amino acid composition, protein length, molecular weight, hydrophobicity, and
molecular charge [169].
6.3 The AlphaFreque Tool
The contribution of this chapter is a tool for counting alphabetical frequencies
(AlphaFreque) of longer subsequence motifs of peptide or nucleotides.
AlphaFreque extends other work with the following contributions:
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Protein Set Description Count Bytes Source
Araneae toxins Spiders 1,833 131,928 [95]
ATDB toxins Venomous animals 3,820 275,701 [93]
BTXPred toxins Bacteria 183 105,707 [185]
Conotoxins Predatory sea-snails 6,251 207,350 [114]
DBETH toxins Bacterial exotoxins 227 91,595 [37]
E. coli toxins E. coli 36 3,140 [7]
NTXPred toxins Predatory neurotoxins 930 60,791 [186]
BTXPred non-toxins Bacterial non-toxins 498 164,828 [185]
Human non-toxins Humans 399 8,864 [7]
NTXPred non-toxins Predatory non-toxins 370 127,520 [186]
Totals 14,547 1,177,424
Table 6.1: Statistics of the ten different protein sets used as input.
• Increasing the length of peptide sequence analysis to eight characters
(20-letter alphabet);
• Increasing the length of nucleotide sequence analysis to 16 characters
(four-letter alphabet); and
• Improving visualizations of sequence frequencies through clearer labeling
and translation of data into more meaningful matrix compositions.
6.3.1 Tool Repository
The code for the tool is available in an online Git repository.2 Also included are the
ten sets of input files and two separate aggregate files, one for all toxins and one
for all non-toxins. The code base can perform peptide analysis for 6-mers or
8-mers, and nucleotide analysis for 8-mers or 16-mers. It has the option to
perform codon optimization for humans, E. coli, or random. For visualizations,
there is also a MATLAB script showing how to produce images shown in this
chapter based on the output files.
2https://github.com/irrumator88/AlphaFreque
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6.3.2 Peptide Encoding
One insight that makes this work unique is that it is more efficient to count
frequencies of a 20-letter alphabet using a base-20 numbering system. This way,
a 6-mer can be counted in a matrix of all possible 3-mer rows and all possible
3-mer columns. Similarly, an 8-mer can be counted in a matrix of all possible
4-mer rows and columns. There is thus a one-to-one ratio of each matrix cell to
each possible 6-mer or 8-mer. Recall Figure 6.3a from the Pse-in-One tool which
used a 90x90 (8,100) matrix for counting all possible 3-mers (8,000).
Given the 20-letter peptide alphabet, each character represents 0-19 in base
20 as shown in Table 6.2. For a 6-mer analysis, there are 206 (64, 000, 000)
possible sequences, requiring an 8,000x8,000 matrix. For an 8-mer analysis,
there are 208 (25, 600, 000, 000) possible sequences, requiring a 160,000x160,000
matrix. The first half of each subsequence is the row, and the second half is the
column.
Example calculations are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. At the extremes, the
6-mer AAAAAA is located at [0,0] and VVVVVV is located at [7999,7999].
Somewhere in between those two extremes is NDCMFP, which is located at
[864,5074]. Similar calculations are performed for 8-mers, with AAAAAAAA
located at [0,0], VVVVVVVV located at [159999,159999], and NDCRMFPR
located at [17281,101481]. With this encoding system in base 20, it is possible to
progressively scan any FASTA sequence and produce counts of all possible
6-mers or 8-mers.
The basic process for 6-mer counting is described in Algorithm 1. First,
instantiate an 8,000x8,000 matrix with initialized values of zero for all cells. Then,
progressively scan every six characters of the input file, chopping the left three
characters for the row and the right three characters for the column. Translate
each pair of the three characters into decimal numbers using the base-20 coding
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A R N D C E Q G H I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
L K M F P S T W Y V
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Table 6.2: Base-20 encodings for the peptide alphabet.
i[0] i[1] i[2] Sum/Row j[0] j[1] j[2] Sum/Column
A A A A A A
0x400 0x20 0 0 0x400 0x20 0 0
V V V V V V
19x400 19x20 19 7999 19x400 19x20 19 7999
N D C M F P
2x400 3x20 4 864 12x400 13x20 14 5074
Table 6.3: Example base-20 calculations for 6-mers.
i[0] i[1] i[2] i[3] Sum/Row j[0] j[1] j[2] j[3] Sum/Column
A A A A A A A A
0x8000 0x400 0x20 0 0 0x8000 0x400 0x20 0 0
V V V V V V V V
19x8000 19x400 19x20 19 159999 19x8000 19x400 19x20 19 159999
N D C R M F P R
2x8000 3x400 4x20 1 17281 12x8000 13x400 14x20 1 101481
Table 6.4: Example base-20 calculations for 8-mers.
system from Table 6.2, and increment by one the cell associated at that row and
column. The process is only slightly different for 8-mers, requiring an
exponentially larger matrix.
Algorithm 1 Frequency counting algorithm for 6-mer peptides.
1: Input: a concatenated file of peptide sequences
2: instantiate matrix6mer[8000][8000] with zeros
3: for all peptide sequences do scan progressively every six characters
4: translate left half and right half of 6-mer using base-20 encoding
5: left half→ i ; right half→ j
6: matrix6mer[i][j]++
7: end for
8: Output: a 8000x8000 matrix with counts of the input file
After analyzing the input, AlphaFreque writes two different output files for
further analysis. Figure 6.4a shows the first ten rows of output for the first file,
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which has three space-separated columns. The first column is the X coordinate,
the second column is the Y coordinate, and the third column is the frequency of
the count of the 8-mer at that X-Y coordinate. Any X-Y coordinate pairs that are
not part of the output indicates that there was a count of zero (those 8-mers did
not appear) in the input file. The order of the output is sorted first by row-major
ascending, then secondarily by column-major ascending.
Figure 6.4b shows the first ten rows of output for the second file, which has
two columns separated by a semicolon. Each row is the string representation of
the 8-mer followed by its frequency from the input file. The output is sorted
descending by frequency. If any 8-mer strings do not appear in the output file, that
means they did not appear in the input file.
(a) First of two sample output files.
The three columns represent the X
coordinate, the Y coordinate, and the
frequency of the 8-mer at those X-Y
coordinates.
(b) Second of two sample output files.
The semicolon-separated values are
the 8-mer string and its frequency,
sorted descending by frequency.
Figure 6.4: Sample output files from AlphaFreque.
6.3.3 Nucleotide Encoding
All of the chosen protein sequences were originally encoded using the 20-letter
peptide alphabet shown in Table 6.2. However, when discovered in nature, they
would have been sequenced using the four-letter nucleotide alphabet from actual
DNA strands. There are 43 (64) possible ways to make a nucleotide triplet from [A,
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C, G, T/U],3 so the 20-letter peptide alphabet represents a many-to-one mapping
shown in Figure 6.5. For example, there are six different nucleotide triplets that
encode for the peptide serine (S): 1) AGC; 2) AGU; 3) UCA; 4) UCC; 5) UCG; and
6) UCU.
Figure 6.5: A wheel with all 64 nucleotide triplets as a many-to-one
mapping into the 20-letter peptide alphabet [283].
AlphaFreque can map peptide sequences into two different sets of DNA
nucleotide sequences: one codon-optimized for E. coli hosts, and another
codon-optimized for human hosts. Codon optimization is based on the most
frequently observed mappings for the host species. The rationale for codon
optimization is that protein expression can be higher or lower in a host depending
3When translating, RNA uses the nucleotide uracil (U) instead of thymine (T).
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upon which of the many-to-one peptide mappings are chosen when translating
the protein sequence into a DNA nucleotide sequence [29]. AlphaFreque also
supports random codon optimization.4
Figure 6.6 shows two codon optimization tables, one for humans and one for
E. coli. As an example of how optimization could differ across species, compare
preferences for expressing phenylalanine (F). Humans prefer TTC (55%) over
TTT (45%), but E. coli prefers TTT (58%) over TTC (42%).
Figure 6.6: Codon optimization tables for humans and E. coli.
Optimized nucleotide sequences are then translated into two-digit binary:
A=00; C=01; G=10; T=11. AlphaFreque’s nucleotide encoding is not unique, as it
is common (and necessary) to use two bits to encode four characters to avoid
4Pse-in-One does not offer any type of codon optimization.
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loss of information.5 Algorithm 2 describes te byte-pair counting based on those
binary representations of the protein sequences.
Algorithm 2 Byte-pair counting algorithm for nucleotide-encoded inputs.
1: Input: a concatenated file of nucleotide sequences
2: for all nucleotide sequences do convert nucleotide bases into two-bit encoding
3: end for
4: instantiate byte-pair matrix[256][256] with zeros
5: for all bit-encoded sequences do scan every 16 bits progressively and convert them into decimal for a
left byte i and right byte j
6: matrix[i][j]++
7: end for
8: Output: a 256x256 matrix with byte-pair counts of the input file
The 256x256 matrix stores counts for all possible byte-pairs. For example,
cell [0][0] represents the byte pair [00000000][00000000] (the 8-gram
AAAAAAAA), and cell [255][255] represents byte pair [11111111][11111111] (the
8-gram TTTTTTTT). As an example somewhere in between those two extremes,
cell [121][15] represents byte pair [01111001][00001111] (the 8-gram
CTGCAATT).
The sequences were scanned progressively with a sliding frame of 16 bits,
moving the frame one character at a time. That is, for a 16-gram of
AATTAATTACGTACGT mapping to indices 0-15, the algorithm scanned indices
0-7 (AATTAATT), then indices 1-8 (ATTAATTA), continuing until in the same
manner until reaching indices 8-15 (ACGTACGT).
6.4 Case Study
This chapter asks two research questions:
• RQ1: Is it possible to analyze longer sequence motifs compared to the state
of the art?
5According to Claude Shannon’s fundamental paper on information theory [192], the number
of bits needed to convey information from an alphabet is the binary logarithm of the number of
characters. For nucleotides, log2 4 = 2 bits. For peptides, log2 20 =∼ 4.322 bits.
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• RQ2: If RQ1 is answered yes, is it possible to provide more meaningful
visualizations for those motifs?
6.4.1 Study Methods
For input files, ten different sets of protein sequences were manually selected that
had been curated and clearly described as either toxins or non-toxins in their
FASTA headers. The total dataset comprised 14,547 proteins from the categories
shown in Table 6.1. The proteins were analyzed in two different formats: 1) as the
original peptide encodings; and 2) mapped into DNA nucleotides. Pse-in-One was
used as a benchmark tool for comparison against AlphaFreque.
For the 6-mer peptide and 8-mer nucleotide calculations, we ran all
experiments on the same laptop with a 2.5GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7 with
16GB of RAM. For the 8-mer peptide and 16-mer nucleotide calculations, we ran
all experiments on the same computing cluster with 7232 Intel Xeon cores with a
maximum Java memory pool of 500GB, reserving 480GB for the heap. The
average cluster runtime for 16-mer nucleotides was 6 minutes and 24 seconds,
and the average cluster runtime for 8-mer peptides was 9 minutes and 48
seconds.
The core metric for the study is the maximum integer (k) for which we could
successfully determine accurate counts of all possible combinations of k-length
subsequences appearing in the input files. There are two types of input files: 1)
nucleotide encodings using a four-letter alphabet; and 2) peptide encodings using
a 20-letter alphabet.
6.4.2 Results: RQ1
The tool was run using the ten input sets listed in Table 6.1. For peptide encoding,
all ten sets were scanned for 6-mers and 8-mers. For nucleotide encoding, all ten
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Input File Peptide 6-mers found Ratio (to 206) Peptide 8-mers found Ratio (to 208)
Araneae toxins 53,004 0.0828% 58,853 0.000230%
ATDB toxins 120,697 0.1886% 141,264 0.000552%
BTXPred toxins 88,029 0.1375% 93,932 0.000367%
Conotoxins 62,164 0.0971% 73,633 0.000288%
DBETH toxins 102,746 0.1605% 106,071 0.000414%
E. coli toxins 3,828 0.0060% 3,852 0.000015%
NTXPred toxins 43,669 0.0683% 48,050 0.000188%
BTXPred non-toxins 136,758 0.2137% 144,943 0.000566%
Human non-toxins 7,628 0.0119% 7,687 0.00003%
NTXPred non-toxins 140,668 0.2197% 146,410 0.000571%
All toxins 368,977 0.5765% 414,132 0.001618%
All non-toxins 164,087 0.2564% 173,275 0.000677%
Table 6.5: Number of possible k-mers discovered in each input file, showing
relative sparseness of output matrices.
sets were first optimized for human and E. coli hosts, and then scanned for
8-mers and 16-mers. In addition, two aggregate sets were used as input, one of
all toxins and another of all non-toxins.
AlphaFreque successfully analyzed all input files using 6-mers and 8-mers for
peptides, and 8-mers and 16-mers for nucleotides. An analysis is successful if the
output is an accurate count of the frequencies of all possible k-mer combinations
appearing in the the input file. Results for peptide encoding are summarized in
Table 6.5 which shows how many of the possible k-mer motifs were found in all of
the different input files. Percentage ratios are also reported to highlight the
relative sparseness of the output matrices. Based on these results, RQ1 is
answered in the affirmative.
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Top three 6-mer peptide motifs (all toxins)
Motif X,Y Coordinates Frequency
VLFLTA 7813,4320 637
AVLFLT 390,5416 628
VAVLFL 7619,4270 421
Top three 8-mer peptide motifs (all toxins)
Motif X,Y Coordinates Frequency
IVAVLFLT 79619,85416 397
VAVLFLTA 152390,108320 391
MFTVFLLV 101539,108219 376
Table 6.6: Top toxin peptide motifs.
6.5 Results: RQ2
6.5.1 Peptide Encoding
AlphaFreque includes MATLAB code to generate several different types of
visualizations from the output data. It can be difficult to interpret large matrices
with millions of data points, so the following visualizations only show matrix cells
which are three standard deviations above the mean, as these are more likely to
be of interest evaluating protein characteristics.6
Figures 6.7 through 6.12 show three new types of visualizations for 6-mers
for the all toxin and all non-toxin supersets: 2-D scatter plots; 3-D scatter plots;
and 3-D stem plots. Recall that the only type of visualization offered by
Pse-in-One is a 2-D heat map as seen in Figure 6.3. Figures 6.13 through 6.18
show the same types of visualizations for 8-mers. Unlike Figure 6.3, the axes
have meaningful labels with the actual characters of the peptide motifs, and unlike
Figure 6.3a, there are no superfluous data points.
For all of the visualizations, the x-axis is the first half of the characters of the
motif, the y-axis is the second half of the characters of the motif, and the z-axis is
6Data points beyond three standard deviations from the mean are commonly referred to as
“outliers.” [134]
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the frequency of the motif. There are noticeable spikes for certain motifs, which
biologists can isolate for further investigation. Table 6.6 shows the top three
peptide motifs from the all-toxins input. Given this information and Figure 6.9, a
biologist could easily see that the top two motifs visually stand out as the two
yellow circles. Any nearby motifs with similar high frequencies are also candidates
for further investigation. The spikes are also relatively easy to see in Figure 6.11,
but difficult to find in the 2-D scatter plot of Figure 6.7. This could be addressed by
different hovering techniques or simply coloring those data points differently.
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Figure 6.7: A scatter plot of all 6-mer toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
6.5.2 Nucleotide Encoding
It is easier to visualize smaller matrices, and with nucleotide encoding, each
possible byte pair for 8-mers can represent exactly one pixel of a 65,636-pixel
image. Just as Pse-in-One provides 2-D heat maps, Figure 6.19 shows similar
visualizations for 8-mers for all toxins and all non-toxins optimized for human
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Figure 6.8: A scatter plot of all 6-mer non-toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.9: A 3-D scatter plot of all 6-mer toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.10: A 3-D scatter plot of all 6-mer non-toxin sequences three
standard deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.11: A 3-D stem plot of all 6-mer toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.12: A 3-D stem plot of all 6-mer non-toxin sequences three
standard deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.13: A scatter plot of all 8-mer toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.14: A scatter plot of all 8-mer non-toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.15: A 3-D scatter plot of all 8-mer toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.16: A 3-D scatter plot of all 8-mer non-toxin sequences three
standard deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.17: A 3-D stem plot of all 8-mer toxin sequences three standard
deviations above the mean.
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Figure 6.18: A 3-D stem plot of all 8-mer non-toxin sequences three
standard deviations above the mean.
hosts. AlphaFreque also provides MATLAB code to create 3-D heatmaps, as seen
in Figure 6.20. Again, the axes have more meaningful labels than those in Figure
6.3b, because they translate into the actual characters of the nucleotide motifs.
To show the differences between human and E. coli optimization, Figure 6.21
shows two-dimensional counts for all toxins and all non-toxins optimized for E. coli
hosts, and Figure 6.22 shows that same data in three dimensions.
AlphaFreque thus offers several new visualizations compared to Pse-in-One,
and labels are more meaningful because they translate into the actual motif
characters. The images are less confusing because there are no superfluous
cells. Results are summarized in Table 6.7 and RQ2 is answered in the
affirmative.
113
0:A
AA
A
64
:CA
AA
12
8:G
AA
A
19
2:T
AA
A
25
5:T
TT
T
0:
AA
AA
64
:C
AA
A
12
8:
G
AA
A
19
2:
TA
AA
25
5:
TT
TT
050
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
35
00
40
00
45
00
S
ec
on
d 
fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
First four nucleotides
(a
)A
2-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
l
to
xi
ns
us
in
g
hu
m
an
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
0:A
AA
A
64
:CA
AA
12
8:G
AA
A
19
2:T
AA
A
25
5:T
TT
T
0:
AA
AA
64
:C
AA
A
12
8:
G
AA
A
19
2:
TA
AA
25
5:
TT
TT
020
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
14
00
16
00
S
ec
on
d 
fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
First four nucleotides
(b
)A
2-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
ln
on
-to
xi
ns
us
in
g
hu
m
an
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
Fi
gu
re
6.
19
:
Tw
o-
di
m
en
si
on
al
vi
su
al
iz
at
io
ns
of
al
lt
ox
in
s
an
d
al
ln
on
-to
xi
ns
(h
um
an
op
tim
iz
ed
).
114
Se
co
nd
 fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
Fi
rs
t f
ou
r n
uc
le
ot
id
es
(a
)A
3-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
l
to
xi
ns
us
in
g
hu
m
an
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
Se
co
nd
 fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
Fi
rs
t f
ou
r n
uc
le
ot
id
es
(b
)A
3-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
ln
on
-to
xi
ns
us
in
g
hu
m
an
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
Fi
gu
re
6.
20
:
Th
re
e-
di
m
en
si
on
al
vi
su
al
iz
at
io
ns
of
al
l
to
xi
ns
an
d
al
l
no
n-
to
xi
ns
(h
um
an
op
tim
iz
ed
).
115
0:A
AA
A
64
:CA
AA
12
8:G
AA
A
19
2:T
AA
A
25
5:T
TT
T
0:
AA
AA
64
:C
AA
A
12
8:
G
AA
A
19
2:
TA
AA
25
5:
TT
TT
050
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
35
00
40
00
45
00
50
00
S
ec
on
d 
fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
First four nucleotides
(a
)A
2-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
l
to
xi
ns
us
in
g
E
.
co
li
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
0:A
AA
A
64
:CA
AA
12
8:G
AA
A
19
2:T
AA
A
25
5:T
TT
T
0:
AA
AA
64
:C
AA
A
12
8:
G
AA
A
19
2:
TA
AA
25
5:
TT
TT
050
0
10
00
15
00
S
ec
on
d 
fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
First four nucleotides
(b
)A
2-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
ln
on
-to
xi
ns
us
in
g
E
.
co
li
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
Fi
gu
re
6.
21
:
Tw
o-
di
m
en
si
on
al
vi
su
al
iz
at
io
ns
of
al
lt
ox
in
s
an
d
al
ln
on
-to
xi
ns
(E
.c
ol
io
pt
im
iz
ed
).
116
50
00
 
4
00
0 
30
00
 
2
00
0 
10
00
 
'5/
 
�s:
 if�
 
Se
co
nd
 fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
Fi
rs
t f
ou
r n
uc
le
ot
id
es
(a
)A
3-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
l
to
xi
ns
us
in
g
E
.
co
li
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
Se
co
nd
 fo
ur
 n
uc
le
ot
id
es
Fi
rs
t f
ou
r n
uc
le
ot
id
es
(b
)A
3-
D
he
at
m
ap
of
al
ln
on
-to
xi
ns
us
in
g
E
.
co
li
nu
cl
eo
tid
e
op
tim
iz
at
io
n.
Fi
gu
re
6.
22
:
Th
re
e-
di
m
en
si
on
al
vi
su
al
iz
at
io
ns
of
al
l
to
xi
ns
an
d
al
l
no
n-
to
xi
ns
(E
.c
ol
io
pt
im
iz
ed
).
117
Tool Visualizations Supported Are Labels and Cell Numbers
Meaningful?
Pse-in-One •2-D heat map No
AlphaFreque •2-D heat map
•3-D heat map
•2-D scatter plot
•3-D scatter plot
•3-D stem plot
Yes
Table 6.7: Comparison of k-mers which can be analyzed using Pse-in-One
vs. AlphaFreque.
6.6 Discussion
As an initial investigation of the usefulness of the output data for determining
whether a protein sequence was a toxin or non-toxin, we randomly took 10% of
each of the toxin and non-toxin outputs for the frequencies of 8-mer peptides. The
data was used to train models for MATLAB’s Classification Learner, but none of
the standard settings produced models which were statistically significant for
determining whether sequences were toxins or not. It thus remains to determine
what methods are best for analyzing the data for toxin classification, a task which
we leave for future work.
Regardless, biologists can use AlphaFreque to analyze any nucleotide or
peptide inputs, not just those which have been clearly identified as toxins or not.
In particular, the 8-mer peptide analysis is useful for studying motifs which are the
length of microRNA. Also, biologists might further investigate the data from Table
6.5, which reports the relative sparseness of the output matrices for different sets
of protein inputs.
6.7 Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter describes an improved method and tool for analyzing and visualizing
motifs in nucleotide and peptide sequences. AlphaFreque can analyze peptide
sequences up to 8-mers and nucleotide sequences up to 8-mers. The tool
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supports the creation of several new types of visualizations which feature
meaningful labels and do not include superfluous data.The tool also allows for
three types of codon optimization: 1) human; 2) E. coli ; and 3) random.
It is possible to extend AlphaFreque’s codon optimization to other species,
assuming the optimization tables are known. Another extension could be
developing new visualizations appropriate to use as input for machine-learning
classifiers. The output is a large set of xyz coordinates which can be plotted in
many ways, but not all of them are easy to interpret, especially for the largest sets
generated by peptide 8-mers and nucleotide 16-mers. It would be especially
useful to make the tool available through a web-based application, along with
additional ways to present the data within visualizations which pop out the
frequencies and motifs as users move the mouse over different data points.
Another helpful feature would be to perform comparisons of different output
files. Some suggestions include finding the union and intersection among the
most frequent or least frequent motifs, as well as other general methods for
filtering output.
Lastly, due to the exponential nature of the algorithm, it would be challenging
to create a tool that analyzes longer subsequences. However, the resulting
matrices are relatively sparse, as shown in Table 6.5. That is, most of the entries
are zero because those sequences do not occur in the input files. For example,
when scanning for 8-mers in the all-toxins file, only 414,132 of the possible 208
8-mers appear, meaning a large amount of memory is allocated but never needed
for incrementing counts. Depending upon characteristics of input files, the
sparseness of the matrices should grow as the length of subsequences is
increased.
Instead of instantiating a matrix full of zeros to start, one major improvement
for memory usage would be to only track frequencies of motifs upon their first
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discovery. Each discovered motif could be a separate object with a counter
variable.
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Chapter 7
TreAssure: Integrating Safety and Security Artifacts to Build
Assurance Cases for Synthetic Biology Applications
7.1 Introduction
Biological software, like traditional software, needs to be tested, validated, and
verified for correctness within its run-time environment. Not only do cells perform
functions, but they can also interact with other life and the environment, meaning
they require high assurance and are safety critical [44,70]. In addition, there are
molecular systems which are being designed to be used in specific safety-critical
scenarios such as for use in diagnostic or therapeutic systems [60]. Regulators
typically expect some type of certification for safety-critical systems and
development processes [124], but it is not clear what types of certification are
appropriate for biological software.
As with any technology, it is challenging to verify that system designs are
correct and that they will operate as intended in their target environments. For
example, SB gene drives have been tested on specific species of mosquitoes to
limit transmission of the Zika virus, but it is unclear what the long-term
consequences might be for the greater ecosystem [20]. As in other domains, SB
applications can fail or result in unintended consequences through mistakes or
unknown interactions among components or with the environment. As SB
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applications become more widespread, there is also growing attention to the
potential effects of negligent or malevolent behavior [153]. Therefore, any
regulatory framework should require certifications for both safety and security.
In response to the growth of SB applications, there is growing attention for
improved regulation [73], but there has been little progress from a national or
international perspective to effectively regulate in a way which promotes safety
and security while at the same time not stifling innovation [69,148]. Initial steps
are needed to assist stakeholders in generating meaningful artifacts for certifying
the safety and security of SB applications. Some initial research has suggested
assurance cases can be built for SB as one way to facilitate regulation [44,70], yet
there are several impediments to achieving this goal.
It is challenging to create assurance cases for SEBOs because they are living
organisms which can evolve or mutate out of their engineered behavior or escape
their intended environments. It is also difficult to effectively monitor and observe
the state of engineered bacteria whose populations are typically billions of cells.
Finally, synthetic biologists likely lack the experience and background knowledge
needed to create assurance cases.
There has been some research supporting assurance for specific aspects of
the SB domain, but little research supporting the overall process of generating
assurance cases for SB. Examples include ways to assure the robustness of
SEBOs [60,230] and proposing dynamic assurance cases to address biological
evolution [44]. There remains a need to build a family of assurance and safety
techniques for SB.
This chapter looks to the safety community and leverages prior work on
traceable links between safety and security artifacts of fault trees and
attack-defense trees [111,133]. Those two artifacts are a logical starting point
because regulators typically expect them, and engineers already have a strong
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familiarity with creating them. Importantly, those artifacts naturally provide
foundations for safety and security requirements by identifying mitigations, and a
regulator should expect to see evidence that directly traces to support
implementation of those mitigations. Serendipitously, the leaves of assurance
cases are evidence nodes.
Another benefit of assurance cases is they support several types of nodes.
Context nodes are especially important for SEBOs because regulators should
expect certification that they are safe and secure within an intended environment.
Regulators do not expect airplanes [53,183] or medical devices [30,137,223] to
operate safely and securely in all possible contexts, and assurance cases
explicitly address this.
Fault trees and attack-defense trees could be integrated into a new workflow
which helps build the assurance case. The assurance case is an important
addition because it allows for an iterative process for identifying assumptions,
justifications, contexts, and empirical evidence to show critical hazards and faults
from have been properly considered and mitigated. However, these different
artifacts are normally created by different people and are independent of each
other. There is no single approach to merge all three.
In this work we propose a new approach called “TreAssure” that starts with
safety and security artifacts and merges them into an assurance case. The benefit
of this approach is that it starts with the simplest diagrams and helps automate
creation of the most complex diagram, the assurance case. It provides traceability
between the security and safety requirements to the assurance evidence,
providing the set of experimental evidence needed by regulators, including a link
back to specific requirements. As safety and security requirements are added or
changed, the associated assurance case can be flagged for relevant updates.
The next section presents some background and a motivating example.
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Figure 7.1: Beneficial qualities of the three different artifacts.
Section 7.3 provides an overview of TreAssure, followed by a case study in
Section 7.4 and related work in Section 7.6.
7.2 Motivation and Background
This section describes the need for a new approach, provides some background
on the individual artifacts used in this paper, and presents a motivating example
for TreAssure.
7.2.1 Background
SB applications are engineered, programmed, and safety-critical, naturally
lending themselves to assurance cases [44,70]. However, there is currently no
requirement to produce safety or security artifacts for SB applications, and
synthetic biologists are unlikely to have experience creating such documents [70].
To encourage effective compliance, proposals for new regulatory frameworks
should be based on familiar concepts to encourage collaboration among
stakeholders, and there should be guidance regarding how to generate effective
artifacts. Safety analysts, security analysts, and regulators are already
accustomed to fault trees and attack-defense trees, but it is not obvious how those
two artifacts should inform the creation of assurance cases.
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7.2.2 Three Different Artifacts
Fault trees, attack-defense trees, and assurance cases all have their own
advantages and disadvantages. Figure 7.1 shows the beneficial qualities of the
three different artifacts, none of which overlap.
Fault trees provide a quantitative analysis for differing types of faults. They
are useful because they provide an easy way to visualize a cause-and-effect
model. They consist of fault nodes along with event nodes and allow for
probabilities and severity annotations. They use Boolean logic to ensure
soundness and are commonly used by regulators. They focus on single
component failures, not system failures [133] or independent events which
together lead to a fault. The process of identifying the paths to a failure in a fault
tree is often a black box and there is little guidance for analysts on how to find
those paths because the tree is simply the result of the analysis [133]. Moreover,
there is great variability in the quality of fault trees because they depend upon the
analyst’s expertise in creating and understanding them [133]. Support for
fault-tree analysis in critical systems has recently been aided by a proposed
SysML profile for fault trees [41].
Attack-defense trees are used to show methods of protection of a system
from security attacks. They include both the method of attack and the defense
that the system will take to mitigate these attacks. They typically have both attack
nodes and mitigation nodes, and are decomposable to provide traceability to
system libraries. Attack-defense trees suffer from similar problems as fault trees
because they only reflect known attacks, further limited by whether the analyst is
actively aware of them and identifies them in the analysis [58].
Assurance cases (sometimes called “safety cases”) provide a comprehensive
argument structure showing that a system will operate correctly and safely with
leaf nodes containing evidence to validate the assurance case claims. They have
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goal nodes and strategy nodes, which can link to assumptions, justifications, and
contexts, which determine the safe operating environment. While assurance
cases use the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), there is a great degree of
freedom in how analysts can structure them. That is, two different analysts might
create two completely different assurance cases for the same system which are
both valid but look nothing like each other and have completely different text
within the nodes. This lack of rigidity or formalism can lead to readability issues
and a resulting lack of clarity [129]. This problem can be alleviated through the
development of well formed patterns [53] and domain-specific sub-patterns which
can be more easily instantiated by end users [70].
Assurance cases are also expected to handle a large and wide variety of
evidence to support the arguments, which leads to a lack of coherence and
consistency [129]. Because assurance cases rely heavily on natural language,
which itself offers a great degree of freedom, it can become difficult to correctly,
coherently, and sufficiently craft an argument structure with appropriate context,
assumption, and justification nodes [129].
All three artifacts are time-intensive and require deep understanding and
expertise. In particular, assurance cases have readability and scalability issues.
However, each of them have inherent value and if they can be developed as a
connected set of artifacts, their usefulness would be greater than the sum of their
parts. This could improve the regulatory process for systems which span multiple
engineering domains.
7.2.3 Motivating Example
We present a motivating example based on the temperature-sensitive kill switch
from the methane-inhibiting application based on the 2017 UNL iGEM team [282]
(see Section 7.4 for a more complete description). Stirling, et al., define kill
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switches as “artificial systems that result in cell death under certain
conditions.” [196]
A complete system application would involve adding the engineered bacteria
to cattle feed so they become part of the biome in the digestive system where
they are able to interfere with the metabolic pathway which produces methane
within the cattle rumen [282]. To prevent the engineered bacteria from interacting
with the general environment, one safety requirement could be that they are only
able to live and operate within the digestive system of the cattle. To ensure the
bacteria do not survive after excretion, a temperature-sensitive kill switch
(cryodeath) is chosen to meet that safety requirement [196]. As shown in Figure
7.2, the kill switch is stable at temperatures inside the cattle (around 37° C), and
activates at temperatures of 22° C and below.
Figure 7.2: Cells produce roughly the same amount of toxins and antitoxins
at the permissive temperature range, but an excess amount of
toxins at 22° C and below. Image adapted from [196].
It is unclear, from an engineering or regulatory perspective, what types of
artifacts would be appropriate for attesting to the safety and security of such a
safety-critical system. However, a regulator might ask for a fault tree. From that
artifact we would be able to list the failure of the kill switch as a potential leaf node
and we would have several paths that could cause this.
This fault-tree is useful, but does not provide empirical evidence or mitigations
if the kill switch fails. Instead, we might turn to an attack-defense tree, another
artifact a regulator may require. A node in the attack-defense tree might describe
an attack by a malicious actor which manipulates the ambient temperature to
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defeat the kill switch, for which we can provide mitigations such as keeping the
cattle and the engineered organisms in a secured, temperature-controlled facility.
This view of safety is also important, but again shows only one facet: security.
Johnson and Kelly have already identified the challenges of co-assurance
across the domains of safety and security [111]. They introduced the
Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) to help link fault-tree artifacts with
attack-tree artifacts, recognizing that a safety expert might not necessarily be a
security expert, and vice versa. However, it should be intuitive to both safety and
security experts that an attack can lead directly to a failure mode.
While the connection of these two artifacts provides safety and security
analysis, neither provides the necessary level of detail and evidence that this
application works as expected in its operational environment. An important
motivation for implementing kill switches is biological containment and confining
an engineered biological system within specific environments [196]. This
suggests the importance of adding an assurance case, because its structure
contemplates operational contexts and identifies what evidence or experiments
are needed to satisfy the arguments indicating each requirement is met. The
process of building assurance cases incorporates: 1) domain modeling and
analysis; 2) system development and verification; and 3) safety analysis and
argument development, the results of which can be organized into tables [50].
Assuming a fault tree and attack-defense tree are properly instantiated, the
next phase of work involves cross-domain sharing of knowledge between fault
trees and attack-defense trees to semi-automate assurance cases, rather than
building them from scratch. This will lead to traceable links between safety and
security and point to evidence that demonstrates mitigations are in place. As part
of the process, analysts can identify agents responsible for implementing and
monitoring the applications. This is the goal of TreAssure, which is present next.
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7.3 TreAssure: General Process
TreAssure uses the information in the fault trees and attack-defense trees to
formulate an assurance case that addresses both safety and security. While
developing the fault tree and attack-defense tree, the safety and security experts
will be able to identify critical faults and hazards which can lead to an unsafe state.
Each leaf node from the fault tree and attack-defense tree should be traceable to
at least one evidence node, a process which could be semi-automated.
Figure 7.3: Four phases of the TreAssure workflow integrating the fault
tree and attack-defense tree with biological safety requirements
to show mitigations are implemented in the assurance case.
Mitigations are implemented in the design and code. An initial,
semi-automated assurance case checks that there is sufficient
evidence that the product satisfies the safety and security
requirements for the identified operational environments. The
semi-automated assurance case will be iteratively refactored
because the application and environment typically evolve over
time.
Two intermediate artifact tables are required to add rigor to the process of
tracing hazards to mitigations and implementations. A generic overview of the
tables is shown in Table 7.1, and the four phases of the TreAssure workflow is
shown in Figure 7.3.
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Table 7.1: Description of tables needed for TreAssure workflow.
Table Name Lead Role Column Headings Purpose
Hazards Table Safety Engineer •Fault Nodes
•Description
•Mitigation Requirement
•Responsible Agent(s)
•Assurance Nodes
Identify key safety hazards to
trace to mitigations and assurance
nodes
Attack-Defense Table Security Engineer •Defense Nodes
•Description
•Responsible Agent(s)
•Assurance Nodes
Identify key security defenses to
trace to assurance nodes
7.3.1 Phase One
In phase one of Figure 7.3, three roles must be performed. The synthetic biologist
identifies requirements for the SEBOs, the safety engineer identifies hazards, and
the security engineer identifies attacks and mitigations. The information gathered
in phase one is used in phase two.
7.3.2 Phase Two
Phase two also requires three roles. The synthetic biologist generates the design
of the DNA parts appropriate for the desired SEBO behavior. The safety engineer
generates a fault tree and hazards table described in Table 7.1. The hazards table
identifies the fault nodes with their textual descriptions and assigns mitigation
requirements along with a responsible agent. The trace from fault node to
responsible agent can be a one-to-many relationship. The exact labels for the
assurance nodes are not likely to be known, so that column could initially be blank
or “TBD.” The security engineer produce an attack-defense table based upon the
security analysis. The attack-defense table described in Table 7.1 identifies
defense nodes with their textual descriptions and also assigns responsible agents.
Again, exact labels for assurance nodes are not likely to be known at this time.
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7.3.3 Phase Three
Phase three is a collaboration with all three engineers and other stakeholders
such as project managers to evaluate an intermediate assurance case which
could be developed with some automation. Every node identified in the first two
tables should be initially populated in the assurance case as an evidence node.
The nodes related to the fault tree should support a sub-goal of safety, and the
nodes related to the attack-defense tree should support a sub-goal of security.
The language of the attack-defense tree nodes can be copied into evidence
nodes directly, but the language from the fault tree nodes will need to be negated.
For example, “Safety system fails” in a fault node would become “Safety system
does not fail” in an evidence node.
7.3.4 Phase Four
Phase four is an iterative process for refining or refactoring the assurance case to
determine whether some evidence nodes can be combined, expanded, or marked
as undeveloped. The text of the nodes can also be refined based upon updated
experimental data or modified requirements.
At minimum, all fault nodes and mitigation nodes should lead to well
developed evidence nodes within the assurance case. However, it could be
appropriate for fault nodes to link to assumptions, justifications, or contexts,
depending upon the operational environments. The tables can act as a checklist
for confirming mitigations have been properly considered and implemented with
trace links to the assurance case.
Any modification to one of the artifacts can then trigger warning flags for all of
the linked nodes in the other artifacts for analysts to verify whether they have
maintained correctness. For example, if the host organisms evolve or mutate to
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overcome a safety feature, it could mean that a mitigation is defeated or that a
new fault is possible. These links facilitate cooperation across domains of
expertise, and provide greater modularity and reuse for engineers. Importantly,
they can provide regulators with improved coherence among the different artifacts
needed to certify a cross-disciplinary, safety-critical system.
In the following section, we present a small case study to show how
TreAssure works in practice.
7.4 TreAssure: Case Study
To evaluate the feasibility of TreAssure, consider the motivating example of
engineering E. coli to reduce methane emissions combined with a
temperature-sensitive kill switch (see Figure 7.2). To simplify the example,
discussion is limited to safety and security of the kill-switch feature, recognizing
that a full analysis of the system would be much more complicated. For example,
it should also include analysis of the methane reduction system as well as
supply-chain attacks related to DNA synthesis and food delivery.
The bacteria from Figure 7.2 are engineered to produce roughly the same
amount of toxins and anti-toxins when at warmer temperatures (22° C-37° C), but
an excess of toxins below 22° C [196]. This is an appropriate range for biological
applications within mammalian digestive systems, to trigger termination after the
cells are excreted. We simulated roles as the various engineers for this case
study.
7.4.1 Phase One
The SEBO requirements are based on Figure 7.2, producing two main safety
hazards: 1) the kill switch does not trigger when it should; and 2) the kill switch
triggers when it should not. We similarly identified two main attacks: 1) causing
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Figure 7.4: Fault tree for the cryodeath kill switch.
the kill switch to trigger when it should not; and 2) preventing the kill switch from
triggering when it should.
7.4.2 Phase Two
We produced the fault tree in Figure 7.4 and the attack-defense tree in Figure 7.5.
The two main hazards are represented as nodes F2 and F3 in Figure 7.4. The
specific causes to be mitigated are the leaf nodes of F8-F13 populated in Table
7.2, indicating that either the DNA of the kill switch itself can mutate within the
cells, or the cells themselves can mutate to overcome the kill switch as a
population by not passing its code to its children. This a natural biological process
because cells do not normally contain kill switches, and to maintain them cells
must expend resources which otherwise could be dedicated to survival and
reproduction.
We then populate the attack-defense table shown in Table 7.3 based on the
attacks and mitigations from attack-defense tree from Figure 7.5. Populating the
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Table 7.2: Hazards traced to mitigation requirements.
Fault Nodes Description Mitigation Requirement Responsible Agent(s)
for Planned Mitigation
Assurance Nodes
F8 Kill-switch system
mutates to produce
excessive antitoxins
Utilize stable organisms DNA synthesis facility;
Modeling software; Lab
technicians; Regulatory
Agencies
G3, E9
F9 Kill-switch system
mutates to produce
insufficient toxins
Utilize stable organisms DNA synthesis facility;
Modeling software; Lab
technicians; Regulatory
Agencies
G3, E10
F10 & F13 Excessive mutation
of cells overcomes
kill-switch system
Utilize stable organisms DNA synthesis facility;
Modeling software; Lab
technicians; Regulatory
Agencies
G3, E11, E14
F11 Kill-switch system
mutates to produce
excessive toxins
Utilize stable organisms DNA synthesis facility;
Modeling software; Lab
technicians; Regulatory
Agencies
G3, E12
F12 Kill-switch system
mutates to produce
insufficient antitoxins
Utilize stable organisms DNA synthesis facility;
Modeling software; Lab
technicians; Regulatory
Agencies
G3, E13
table could involve discussions with a synthetic biologist to determine whether the
mitigation requirements are reasonable or feasible. The agents identified as
responsible for the planned mitigation can be people, software or hardware
processes, or regulatory agencies which ultimately provide evidence to support
requirements have been met. Repetition of a mitigation requirement or
responsible agent suggests later groupings and refinements for the assurance
case. The last column for the Assurance Nodes will initially be blank or “TBD.”
Our scenario assumes there are two distinct facilities involved, each with their
own vulnerabilities. One is the feeding facility where the cattle are handled, and
the other is the DNA synthesis facility where the organisms are designed and
engineered for delivery to the feeding facility. An attacker would need either
physical or logical access to one of the facilities, and could either be an internal
employee or external actor. Nodes M1-M8 describe various defense measures
related to physical and logical security, but also include more nuanced
considerations such as employee and client background checks.
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Figure 7.5: Attack-defense tree for the cryodeath kill switch.
Table 7.3: Defenses traced to mitigation requirements.
Defense Nodes Description Responsible Agent(s)
for Planned Mitigation
Assurance Nodes
M1 Physically secure access to feeding
facility
Feeding facility maintenance
manager
G2, E1
M2 Physically secure access to DNA
synthesis facilities
DNA facility maintenance manager G2, E2
M3 Background checks on all employees
and random audits of system usage
DNA facility’s HR and IT managers G2, E3
M4 Two-person teams processing all
orders
DNA facility’s project manager G2, E4
M5 Screening and verification of all
clients
DNA facility’s project manager G2, E5
M6 Air-gapping of DNA synthesis
equipment
DNA facility’s CIO G2, E6
M7 Regular updating and patching of
DNA synthesis systems
DNA synthesis facility’s CIO G2, E7
M8 Validation and certification of DNA
synthesis machines
DNA synthesis facility’s CIO G2, E8
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7.4.3 Phase Three
Next, we assess the intermediate assurance case, which can have
semi-automated sub-goals for safety and security, and one evidence node for
every leaf node from the fault tree and attack-defense tree. One possible
intermediate assurance case is shown in Figure 7.6. The green nodes on the left
side are automatically developed from M1-M8 in the attack-defense tree, and the
red nodes on the right side represent negations of the fault-tree nodes of F8-F13.
7.4.4 Phase Four
We manually collapsed some evidence nodes, with guidance provided by the
trace tables where repetition of mitigation requirements or responsible agents
suggest which nodes are good candidates for combination. For example, E6 and
E7 might combine into E7-1. It is also possible that some of the nodes should be
expanded into multiple evidence nodes, such as E3 expanding into E3-1 and
E4-1. Some nodes might have a many-to-one relationship such as nodes E9-E14
becoming nodes E9-1 and E10-1. It is also possible for some nodes to be deleted
or become undeveloped. The assurance case was built using the software tool
AdvoCATE from Denney and Pai [50].
Figure 7.7 is our finalized assurance case after iterating over evidence nodes
and identifying which can be combined. We then can finalize the assurance node
columns from Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
A regulator should thus be able to review all three of the artifacts, along with
an associated tables, to readily see that all of the faults have been properly and
adequately mitigated. The fault-tree analysis identifies actionable hazards and the
safety requirements to prevent them. The attack-defense tree analysis identifies
actionable vulnerabilities and the requirements needed to prevent them. The
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Figure 7.7: A possible final assurance case after iteration.
assurance case argues there is sufficient evidence to trust that the system is
adequately protected against these hazards and threats for the specified
environment. In other words, the first two artifacts help identify what needs to be
done, and the assurance case shows how the requirements have been met.
7.5 Limitations
A key limitation of this study is that we simulated roles as the engineers, and the
TreAssure workflow should be tested in a more realistic setting to determine its
usefulness and effectiveness. Also, it was only applied to this kill-switch system,
but it is nevertheless representative of other SB systems. We leave a more
complete evaluation as future work.
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7.6 Related Work
Johnson and Kelly originally proposed a method for linking fault trees to
attack-defense trees [111], and there has been some prior work on applying
assurance cases to SB. Cohen, et al., proposed the use of a type of dynamic
assurance case, the assurance timeline to incorporate evolution into the
assurance case [44]. In follow-on work, Firestone and Cohen suggested using
assurance recipes to help end-users build assurance cases [70]. This chapter
differs in that it proposes combining fault trees and attack trees to build a
traceable assurance case.
There has been recent research on the importance of facilitating assurance
case development through well-formed patterns [53,70]. There are now a number
of tools devoted to assessing assurance cases [146], including analysis of safety
architectures in bowtie diagrams which build links to hazard tables [50,52].
There is a robust history of threat modeling, dating as far back as 1977 with
the concept of software architectural patterns introduced by Christopher
Alexander [193]. The core concepts were not introduced until 1994 by Edward
Amaroso, who introduced threat trees based on decision tree diagrams [5]. In
1998, a research group with famed security expert Bruce Schneier introduced the
concept of attack trees in a seminal paper titled “Toward a Secure System
Engineering Methodology.” [187]
There are now several mature methodologies for threat modeling, each with
their respective benefits and drawbacks. The most commonly applied framework,
known by the acronym STRIDE, was developed at Microsoft [193]. STRIDE
stands for: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of
service, and Escalation of privilege. The opposite qualities are those which
should be designed into the system: authenticity, integrity, non-repudiation,
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confidentiality, availability, and authorization [193].
Threat modeling in specialized domains can present specialized challenges.
Medical devices present special challenges because they require regulatory
approval, but “security is a relatively new concern for regulatory bodies;
bug-averse manufacturers have traditionally had little incentive to add security
mechanisms that might cause problems or slow down regulatory approval.” [30]
7.7 Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter has presented TreAssure, a semi-automated method for leveraging
fault trees and attack-defense trees to help develop assurance cases. All three
artifacts have their own benefits, but together they can help stakeholders from
research, industry, and government better certify claims regarding the safety and
security of novel SB applications.
One area for future work involves gathering qualitative and quantitative
feedback from stakeholders using this new workflow in practice for a real-world
SEBO project. Another area involves tool development to automate generation of
the assurance case from the fault trees, attack-defense trees, and the associated
tables.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation has made the argument that SB is a technology with amazing
potential. It could lead to renewable energy, cures for diseases, and even
outer-space exploration. Such a powerful technology, of course, could have
disastrous consequences through negligence or malicious intent. Engineered
organisms can evolve and mutate, making it especially difficult to validate and
verify their behavior.
As an engineering discipline, SB is centered upon programming life through
rational, methodical manipulation of DNA sequences, representing a vast
configuration space. Traditional software engineering principles could be applied
to SB to help all stakeholders reason about novel designs, and interdisciplinary
problems will have interdisciplinary solutions.
The goal of this dissertation is not to conjure up worst-case scenarios, but to
encourage responsible, effective, and beneficial innovation. There is a distinct
lack of meaningful regulation of SB at both the national and international level,
and any new regulatory frameworks must adequately protect the public and the
environment without stifling legitimate research.
Chapter 3 demonstrates how the software engineering concept of assurance
cases could help synthetic biologists consider safety earlier in their
design-build-test cycle. Assurance cases are commonly used in safety-critical
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systems such as avionics, offshore drilling, and nuclear power, but the concept
could be extended to emerging domains such as SB.
Chapter 4 shows how the software engineering concept of feature models
and software product lines could help synthetic biologists reason about the vast
configuration space available for programming DNA sequences. As a case study,
domain knowledge about safety features is used to populate a partial feature
model to help visualize which components are required to build valid and
complete kill switches with specific, desired characteristics.
Chapter 5 is an examination of what makes SB difficult to regulate, but
nevertheless argues there needs to be a renewed international effort to develop
meaningful oversight to ensure safety and security for SEBOs. Traditional hard
laws such as treaties, statutes, and regulations are likely to be inadequate or stifle
legitimate innovation. Soft-law solutions are more likely to effectively establish
meaningful protections for the public and the environment, and all stakeholders
should be a part of the process, including members from industry, academia, and
DIY groups. Software engineers and cybersecurity experts should specifically be
targeted for inclusion, because they can better understand the threats associated
with the software and hardware used in the SB design-build-test cycle.
Chapter 6 describes a lightweight tool to analyze DNA sequences at both the
nucleotide and peptide level, specifically toxin and non-toxin sequences. The
output can then be visualized in a multitude of ways, and also used as input for
pre-existing toxin classification tools.
Lastly, Chapter 7 shows a proposed certification process for regulating SB by
integrating a fault tree and attack-defense tree into an assurance case as part of
an iterative process to help identify unacceptable threats or safety risks. The
process provides traceabaility across all three artifacts to improve overall safety
and security during the design-build-test cycle. The final products are inherently
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interdisciplinary and collaboration among various experts will improve readability,
coherence, and consistency for regulators.
8.1 Future Work
There is ample opportunity to explore future work based on the ideas presented in
this dissertation. The assurance recipes from Chapter 3 could be developed into
an interactive software system to help iGEM teams build assurance cases. A
preliminary interactive safety-feature system was developed by the 2018
University of Nebraska–Lincoln iGEM team to fulfill collaboration requirements
[250].
The feature models from Chapter 4 could lead to a new domain
specific-language for generating SPL constraints. This would need to be
evaluated in practice with teams of synthetic biologists, perhaps also for the iGEM
Competition. Using feature models for SB systems presents challenges, some of
which are typical for SPLs such as scalability, and collaborative workflows. They
also present novel challenges, such as how to represent dynamic elements
related to biological evolution and mutation.
The AlphaFreque tool from Chapter 6, by itself, only provides more data for
analysis. The data from all the different counts, both for peptides and nucleotides
of different lengths, could be fed into existing prediction tools to determine
whether it improves protein prediction accuracy by increasing the length of the
k-mers analyzed. There are ever-increasing methods for analyzing large amount
of data, and it remains to determine which methods best characterize toxins
versus non-toxins.
Notably, prior work has explicitly assumed that variable-length subsequences
are important for determining protein characteristics: “it is unrealistic to assume
that fixed-length k-mers are units of biological sequences and that more
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meaningful units need to be introduced.” [8] However, there is some evidence that
variable-length analyses do not significantly improve protein classification,
suggesting that “k-mer representation [fixed-length motif] is a tough-to-beat
baseline in protein classification problems.” [8] Another method would be to train
an image classifier based on subsets of the toxins and non-toxins. This would
likely be easiest using the 2-D format shown in Figures 6.19 and 6.21.
There is ample opportunity for developing automation of some of the
TreAssure process from Chapter 7 by extending existing software tools. With the
suggested tables populated with hazards and mitigations, an Eclipse plugin or
extension of AdvoCATE [53] could generate template stubs for an assurance
case, possibly using “assurance recipes” based on synthetic biology domain
knowledge [70]. The traceability links could be automatically generated such that
modifications would flag all connected nodes for re-validation. Ideally, all three
tables and all three artifacts would be contained within one software tool for
improved compatibility and file sharing. Another improvement would be to add
predicate logic, probabilities, and severities to TreAssure for further automated
analysis.
Lastly, implementation of the TreAssure workflow from Chapter 7 as a
soft-law best practice for research, industry, and government could help alleviate
some of the regulatory concerns raised in Chapter 5.
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